Transaction Account Fees: Do the Poor Really Pay More than the Rich? by Hill, Julie Andersen
HILL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013 10:30 PM 
 
65 
TRANSACTION ACCOUNT FEES: 
DO THE POOR REALLY PAY MORE THAN THE 
RICH? 
Julie Andersen Hill* 
 
During the Great Recession and its aftermath, customers became 
increasingly concerned about the fees banks charge for checking 
(transaction) accounts.  Some believe that banks’ fee structures are unfair.  
In particular, commentators often assert that high overdraft and other fees 
paid by poor consumers cross-subsidize free accounts for rich consumers 
or businesses.  If true, this regressive cross-subsidization could be forcing 
some consumers to do without banking services or to use more costly fringe 
financial service providers.  Moreover, if regressive cross-subsidization 
exists, it would provide a powerful argument for increased regulation of 
account fees. 
Despite frequent claims that poor accountholders cross-subsidize rich 
accountholders, there is little scholarship examining or establishing such 
claims.  This Article examines both theoretical and empirical evidence of 
cross-subsidization among transaction accountholders.  Contrary to the 
assumptions made in much of the account fee literature, this Article 
concludes there is little evidence that the poor cross-subsidize the rich. 
What the Article does find, however, is contradictory account fee 
regulation.  Some regulations encourage fee structures with high 
overdrafts while other regulations simultaneously discourage overdraft 
fees.  This Article recommends that instead of focusing on cross-
subsidization, policymakers should work to establish a coherent theory of 
transaction account fee regulation.  A coherent theory of fee regulation 
could correct this inconsistency and provide clear direction for banks. 
 
 
* Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law.  I am grateful to Aaron Bruhl, 
Darren Bush, Bryan Fair, Chad Pomeroy, Christopher Sagers, and Michael Hill for their 
helpful comments on this Article.  I am also indebted to the faculties of Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, the University of Arkansas School of Law, and the 
University of Alabama School of Law, who kindly allowed me to present the Article at 
faculty workshops. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In our modern economy, consumers rely on a variety of payment 
systems.  They pay by cash, checks, credit cards, debit cards, prepaid cards, 
automated clearing house (ACH) transfers, and internet accounts.  While 
there are numerous payment choices, many of the choices require a 
common ingredient—a transaction account.  A transaction account, often 
called a checking account, is a bank account used to make payments to 
third parties.
1
  Consumers withdraw money from their transaction accounts 
by writing checks, using debit cards, using automated teller machine 
(ATM) cards, or authorizing electronic withdrawals of money (such as 
providing an account number and bank routing number to a merchant or 
using a bank’s online bill pay service).  Survey data indicate that 91.8% of 
consumers in the United States have at least one transaction account.
2
 
Banks charge transaction accountholders a variety of fees.  While 
transaction accounts’ fee structures differ from bank to bank (and even 
account to account), common fees include overdraft fees,
3
 insufficient 
funds fees,
4
 return item fees,
5
 stop payment fees,
6
 and account maintenance 
fees.
7
  Some banks also assess teller fees,
8
 smart-phone banking fees,
9
 
 
 1. 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(C) (Supp. 2011); 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(e) (2012). 
 2. Kevin Foster et al., 2009 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice, FED. RESERVE BANK 
OF BOSTON PUB. POL’Y DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 11-1, at 47 (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/ppdp/2011/ppdp1101.pdf. 
 3.  A bank assesses an overdraft fee when it pays an item even though the customer’s 
account does not have sufficient funds to cover the transaction.  U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-281, BANK FEES: FEDERAL BANKING REGULATORS 
COULD BETTER ENSURE THAT CONSUMERS HAVE REQUIRED DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS PRIOR 
TO OPENING CHECKING OR SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 1 (2008), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08281.pdf [hereinafter GAO, BANK FEES REPORT]. 
 4. A bank assesses an insufficient funds fee when it returns an item that would have 
overdrawn the customer’s account.  Id. at 4–5. 
 5.  A bank assesses a return item fee when a customer deposits an item that is later 
returned unpaid.  Id. at 12. 
 6. A bank assesses a stop payment fee for processing a customer’s order to stop 
payment on a previously written check.  Id. 
 7. Banks typically assess maintenance fees “on a monthly basis for maintaining a 
checking . . . account.  Depository institutions frequently waive routine service fees for 
customers who maintain a monthly minimum balance or meet other requirements, such as 
for direct deposits of paychecks.”  Id. 
 8. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Attack of the New Bank Fees, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 
2012, at B8 (“PNC . . . hits customers with a $3 fee when they use a teller to transfer money.  
Bank of America already charges online customers for making deposits or withdrawals 
through a teller.”). 
 9. Id. (“U.S. Bancorp already hits customers with a 99-cent fee to make a mobile 
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paper statement fees,
10
 and a variety of other fees. 
In recent years, banks have increased transaction account fees.  A 
Government Accountability Office study found that between 2000 and 
2007, banks’ fees for insufficient funds, overdrafts, returns of deposited 
items, and stop payment orders all increased.
11
  Fee increases continued as 
the country entered the Great Recession.
12
  The typical overdraft fee 
increased by a dollar between 2007 and 2008.
13
  Monthly account 
maintenance charges increased even more.
14
  At the same time, the weak 
economy made it harder for some consumers to avoid overdraft and 
insufficient funds fees or maintain a balance high enough to avoid 
maintenance charges.  A 2009 study by the Center for Responsible 
Lending, a consumer advocacy group, estimated that bank fees collected 
for overdrafts had increased 35% between 2006 and 2008.
15
  Today the 
 
deposit.  To see pending transactions on their phones, customers at Mercantile Bank of 
Michigan have to pay $4 a month.”). 
 10. See Candice Choi, A Richer 2012: A Monthly Guide to Maximizing Money, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 26, 2011, at B6 (“The monthly service fee for a basic checking 
account at U.S. Bank, for example, is $6.95 when customers opt for e-statements.  If 
customers opt for paper statements, however, their monthly fee is $8.95.”). 
 11. GAO, BANK FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 68.  Using different data that was not 
representative of the banking industry generally, the GAO concluded that account 
maintenance fees may have decreased during the same time period.  Id. at 67, 69.  At any 
rate, the study concluded that the percentage of bank income collected from fees rose from 
2000 to 2006.  Id. at 17–20.  Others also noted an increase in bank fees during this time 
period.  See, e.g., Thomas Watterson, Beware of Soaring Bank Fees, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Nov. 17, 2008, at 15 (noting in 2008 that bank fees had been increasing for the 
last ten years). 
 12. “Great Recession” refers to the economic recession that “began in December 2007 
and probably ended in June or July 2009.”  David Wessel, A Big, Bad . . . ‘Great’ 
Recession?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2010, at A2.  Bank fee increases during recessions were 
previously uncommon.  Eric Dash, How High Can They Go?: Banks Quietly Raise Fees in 
Penny-Pinching Times, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at B1 (reporting data collected by bank 
account fee researcher Michael Moebs). 
 13. See Dash, supra note 12, at B8 (noting that the typical overdraft charge increased 
from $25 to $26 and that it had been at only $22 a few years earlier). 
 14. See id. (noting that in June 2009, Bank of America “raised the fees on its basic 
monthly checking account to $8.95 from $5.95”); Obama’s A-Team; The Money Pit; 
Bailout Free-for-all; Read My Lips; Groups Claim Rise in Hate Crimes, LOU DOBBS 
TONIGHT (CNN television broadcast Nov. 24, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 22470689 
(“ATM surcharges, bounced bank check fees and monthly service fees all jump[ed] in one 
year, from September 2007 to September [2008]. . . . Monthly service fees and interest 
bearing accounts [in 2008] averag[ed] almost $12 and the minimum account balance needed 
to avoid those fees [rose] to close to $3,500, four percent higher than [in 2007].”). 
 15. LESLIE PARRISH, OVERDRAFT EXPLOSION: BANK FEES FOR OVERDRAFTS INCREASE 
35% IN TWO YEARS, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Oct. 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/overdraft-loans/research-analysis/crl-overdraft-
explosion.pdf. 
HILL_FINAL; (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  10:30 PM 
68 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
median overdraft fee is $30,
16
 and some experts predict rising transaction 
account fees in the future.
17
 
Transaction account customers have not overlooked banks’ fee 
increases.  When Bank of America announced a monthly $5 fee for 
customers who use a debit card to make purchases, customer Kristen 
Christian posted her complaints about the fee on Facebook and urged her 
friends to transfer their accounts elsewhere.
18
  Ms. Christian’s complaint 
drew a nationwide following that eventually resulted in Bank of America’s 
decision to rescind the fee.
19
  Despite this apparent victory for consumers, 
many believe that Bank of America and other large banks will simply 
increase other account fees.
20
 
While critics of current transaction account fees raise a variety of 
complaints, one of the most common complaints is that banks’ pricing 
structures are unfair to the poor.  One of Ms. Christian’s objections to Bank 
of America’s fee was that the bank would waive the fee for customers who 
maintained a balance of at least $20,000.
21
  Ms. Christian concluded that 
the “fee clearly target[ed] the impoverished [and] working class.”
22
 
 
 16. Press Release, Moebs $ervices, Overdraft Fee Revenue Falls as Banks Raise 
Overdraft Prices (Jan. 18, 2012), available at http://www.moebs.com/Portals/0/pdf/Press 
%20Releases/120111%20Moebs%20PR%20OD%20Revenue%20%20Price%20Final%201-
18-12%20(2).pdf. 
 17. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 8, at B8 (predicting that banks will increase fees 
to offset the costs associated with greater regulation); Elizabeth Reed Smith, The US—To 
Fee or Not To Fee?, THE BANKER, Feb. 1, 2012, at 88.  But see Odysseas Papadimitriou, 
The Rise in Bank Fees Is Over, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR BLOG (Nov. 21, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Saving-Money/2011/1121/The-rise-in-bank-fees-is-
over (predicting that competition for customers will prevent banks from raising account 
fees). 
 18. Aaron Passman, How Kristen Christian Came to Launch Bank Transfer Day, 
CREDIT UNION J., Dec. 19, 2011, at 1, 23. 
 19. See, e.g., Pamela Yip, People Power Vanquishes Debit Card Fee, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 7, 2011, at 1D. 
 20. See E. Scott Reckard, Debit Cards Poised to Get Much Costlier, L.A. TIMES, June 
25, 2011, at B1. 
 21. Bank Transfer Day, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=298049023545 
172 (Oct. 8, 2011, 1:30 PM); see also Passman, supra note 18, at 1, 23 (quoting Ms. 
Christian, who stated:  “It bothered me very deeply at a moral level, because it was clear to 
me that Bank of America was targeting those who couldn’t afford to pay the fee.”); Stuart 
Pfeifer &  E. Scott Reckard, Interest Grows in “Bank Transfer Day,” L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 
2011, at B1 (“Christian said BofA’s planned fee bothered her because it exempted wealthy 
customers who met certain balance requirements, meaning it would hit people who could 
least afford it.”). 
 22. Bank Transfer Day, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=298049023545 
172  (Oct. 9, 2011, 4:31 PM); see also Gary Rivlin, Boycott Your Bank!, THE DAILY BEAST 
(Nov. 3, 2011, 10:02 PM EDT), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/11/03/kristen-
christian-s-bank-transfer-day-puts-withdrawal-squeeze-on-banks.html. 
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Others take the essence of Ms. Christian’s argument a step further.  
They assert that banks’ transaction account pricing results in regressive 
cross-subsidization.  They claim that high account fees paid by the poor 
cross-subsidize “free” transaction accounts for the wealthy.  For example 
Professors John Campbell, Howell Jackson, Brigitte Madrian, and Peter 
Tufano assert that: 
Bank customers who are attracted to initial low rates on checking 
accounts but fail to read the fine print on overdraft fees . . . tend 
to be very profitable.  In a competitive market for financial 
services, these profits are typically passed on to other customers 
in the form of reduced bank charges and lower mortgage rates.  
Naive (often poor and uneducated) customers can end up 
subsidizing sophisticated customers.
23
 
Others use even more strident rhetoric.  According to Reuters writer 
Felix Salmon, “[c]hecking is never free, but in recent years banks have 
been able to conjure the illusion of free through a system of regressive 
cross-subsidies, where the poor pay massive overdraft fees and thereby 
allow the rich to pay nothing.”
24
 
 
 23. John Y. Campbell et al., Making Financial Markets Work For Consumers, HARV. 
BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2011, at 47, 50; see also Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, 
Carrying a Good Joke Too Far, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 879, 890 (2008) (arguing that 
“myopic customers who unknowingly pay hidden fees and account charges” overpay for 
transaction account services thereby creating a “subsidy” for “sophisticated customers”); 
Stephanie J. Weber, Note, Excessive Bank Fees—Theories of Liability and the Need for 
Legislative Action, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1439, 1477 (1995) (arguing that banks give “‘good 
customers’ preferential [fee] treatment” and pass “the cost of bank service . . . on to less-
preferred customers”); Bank Fees Carry Risks, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 3, 2009, at B7 
(arguing that because “one quarter of customers pay all [transaction account fees],” those 
customers  are “essentially subsidizing the other three quarters” of accountholders that 
receive “free” checking); Reckard, supra note 20, at B1 (“For years, banks subsidized most 
debit card holders by levying heavy fees on . . . overdrawn consumers.”).  Even Wikipedia 
seems to have taken as truth that cross-subsidization occurs among transaction 
accountholders, although its description of cross-subsidization in this context is not fulsome.  
Cross Subsidization, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross_subsidization (last 
updated Nov. 9, 2012) (“An example of cross subsidization often occurs in the banking 
industry.  Fees associated with maintaining a low account balance (below $1,000 for 
example) are charged to these customers to maintain their profitability.”). 
 24. Felix Salmon, Interchange and Free Checking, REUTERS (June 17, 2010), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/17/interchange-and-free-checking/; see also 
G.D. Gearino, Dealing with Collateral Damage, BUS.-N.C., Feb. 1, 2011, at 37, 41 
(“Basically, the poor fool who swiped his debit card for a Starbucks double latte when he 
was down to his last two dollars in the bank—and was subsequently dinged with a big 
overdraft fee—paid for his neighbor’s checking account.”); Kevin Drum, Robbing the Poor 
to Give Air Miles to the Rich, MOTHER JONES (June 17, 2010 10:23 AM PDT),  
http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/06/robbing-poor-give-air-miles-rich (stating that 
“overdraft and interchange fees [are] basically surreptitious ways for the poor to subsidize 
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If transaction account fees cross-subsidize wealthy customers, that 
pricing could contribute to social problems.  In addition to placing an unfair 
burden on poor accountholders, high fees could price some poor consumers 
out of the transaction account market.
25
  Without access to transaction 
accounts these “unbanked” and “underbanked”
26
 consumers turn to a 
variety of costly and sometimes predatory financial products like check 
cashing services, money orders, and prepaid cards.
27
  Such a result would 
be particularly intolerable if more efficient account fee pricing could lower 
the cost of transaction account services for poor consumers. 
Unsurprisingly then, regressive cross-subsidization in transaction 
account pricing is often offered as a justification for regulatory transaction 
 
the rich”); Ron Lieber & Andrew Martin, Overspending on Debit Cards Is Painful, but Not 
for Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at A1 (“At the moment, people who pay overdraft fees 
help subsidize the free accounts of those who do not.”). 
 25. “[T]he most common reason persons cite for lacking a [transaction] account is not 
having enough money to be able to afford the costs of account ownership.”  Michael S. 
Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 131 (2004) (citing numerous sources); see 
also Rourke O’Brien, “We Don’t Do Banks”: Financial Lives of Families on Public 
Assistance, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 485, 488 (2012) (discussing a former bank 
customer who discontinued his transaction account due to overdraft fees); Ebonya 
Washington, The Impact of Banking and Fringe Banking Regulation on the Number of 
Unbanked Americans, 41 J. HUM. RESOURCES 106, 110 (2006) (summarizing the results of 
three surveys of consumers who did not have bank accounts).  Of course, there are other 
reasons that some consumers do not have bank accounts.  For example, some may live far 
from a bank branch, may be uncomfortable entering banks, or may lack the needed 
documentation to open an account.  See Barr, supra, at 184; 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY 
OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 26–27 (2012), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2012_unbankedreport.pdf [hereinafter FDIC, 2011 
UNBANKED SURVEY]. 
 26. “Unbanked” is usually defined to encompass those consumers who do not have a 
checking or savings account.  See FDIC, 2011 UNBANKED SURVEY, supra note 25, at 4 n.2.  
“Underbanked” refers to those who have a checking or savings account, but still “rely on 
alternative financial services.”  Id.  This Article, however, focuses only on transaction 
(checking) accounts.  It does not consider savings accounts because savings accounts 
typically allow only six transactions from the account per month.  See Regulation D, 12 
C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2) (2012) (allowing an account to be classified as a savings account for 
reserve purposes only if “the depositor is permitted or authorized to make no more than six 
transfers and withdrawals, or a combination of such transfers and withdrawals, per calendar 
month or statement cycle”). 
 27. See Washington, supra note 25, at 109; see also Candice Choi, Living Without a 
Bank: Fee, Not Free: Plethora of Charges and Inconvenience Price to Pay, HOUS. CHRON., 
Oct. 4, 2010, at A8 (providing a first-person account of living without a transaction 
account).  Because of the prevalence of transaction account-based payment systems and the 
lack of reasonably priced alternatives, former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers 
described transaction accounts as “the most basic link to the mainstream economy.”  Press 
Release, Lawrence H. Summers, Sec’y Treas., Remarks at CFPI Coalition: Extending the 
Frontier of Capital (Jan. 27, 2000), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/ls350.aspx. 
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account price reforms.  Some proposals suggest that the government more 
heavily regulate transaction account pricing to eliminate regressive cross-
subsidization.
28
  Other proposals recommend that regulators require banks 
to provide low-income consumers free or low-cost transaction accounts
29
—
a policy that could result in progressive cross-subsidization.  Unfortunately, 
little research has examined whether transaction account pricing structures 
actually result in regressive cross-subsidization. 
Earlier scholarship has addressed the issue of cross-subsidization in 
financial service pricing, but none of this scholarship focuses directly on 
cross-subsidization among consumer transaction accounts.  For example, 
some assert that consumers who make purchases with cash cross-subsidize 
consumers who pay with credit cards.
30
  Other scholarship focuses on 
whether other bank customers subsidize (or are subsidized by) consumer 
transaction accounts.  In particular, recent debate has focused on whether 
debit card interchange fees charged to merchants subsidize consumer 
 
 28. See Campbell et al., supra note 23, at 50 (suggesting that the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau address efficiency and fairness issues raised by transaction account cross-
subsidization). 
 29. See, e.g., JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, 
PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 131–32 (1994) (advocating basic transaction accounts targeted 
to appeal to low-income consumers); Christopher Choe, Bringing in the Unbanked off the 
Fringe: The Bank on San Francisco Model and the Need for Public and Private 
Partnership, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 365, 392 (2009) (suggesting that the federal 
government partner with banks to ensure that the poor have access to basic banking 
services); Felix Salmon, How to Reform Overdraft Fees, REUTERS, (July 7, 2009), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/07/07/how-to-reform-overdraft-fees/ (suggesting 
that banks be “required by law to offer simple no-frills checking accounts for customers 
who can’t meet minimum-balance requirements and don’t want to pay monthly checking-
account fees”).  Cf. Michael A. Stegman et al., Toward a More Performance-Driven Service 
Test: Strengthening Basic Banking Services Under the Community Reinvestment Act, 9 GEO. 
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 405 (2002) (arguing that the regulators use the Community 
Reinvestment Act as a vehicle to encourage banks to provide deposit accounts to low-
income consumers). 
 30. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant 
Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2008) (contending that “credit card rewards 
programs are funded in part by a highly regressive, sub rosa subsidization of affluent credit 
consumers by poor cash consumers”); Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: 
America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 302–05 (2005) (summarizing an earlier study, John M. Barron et 
al., Discounts for Cash in Retail Gasoline Marketing, 10 CONTEM. ECON. ISSUES 89 (1992), 
as quantifying the cross-subsidization between cash and credit card consumers in the retail 
gasoline market); Scott Schuh et al., Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payment? 
Theory and Calibrations, FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON PUB. POL’Y DISCUSSION PAPER 
NO. 10-3, at 44–45 (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ 
ppdp/2010/ppdp1003.pdf (quantifying “the transfer between cash buyers and credit card 
buyers” and the “the transfer between low-income and high-income households” in the U.S. 
payments market). 
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transaction accounts.
31
  Yet, there have not been any recent efforts to 
comprehensively analyze cross-subsidization among groups of consumer 
transaction accountholders.
32
  This Article fills that gap. 
Contrary to common assumption, there is little reason to believe—
either theoretically or empirically—that regressive cross-subsidization 
exists in the transaction account market.  At the same time, however, 
existing account fee regulation is inconsistent and contradictory.  Some 
regulations encourage fee structures with high overdrafts and other 
“penalty”-type fees while other regulations simultaneously discourage such 
fees. This Article recommends that instead of focusing on cross-
subsidization, policymakers should work to establish a coherent theory of 
transaction account fee regulation.  A coherent theory of fee regulation 
could correct this inconsistency and provide clear direction for banks.  The 
Article proceeds in five parts. 
Part I reviews the economic theory of cross-subsidization.  It explains 
that cross-subsidization is more than charging different prices to different 
groups of consumers.  A cross-subsidy exists only when one group of 
consumers pays less than the incremental cost of the service and another 
group pays more than the stand-alone cost of service. 
Part II discusses the structure of transaction accounts.  It explains that 
banks earn income from transaction accounts in two primary ways:  by 
investing the deposits (often in the form of loans to other customers) and by 
charging account fees.  High-balance accounts generate more investment 
income.  Because, other things being equal, a bank earns more from a high-
balance account than a low-balance account, banks may choose pricing 
structures that charge low-balance accounts more fees.  Banks that price 
low-balance accounts differently than high-balance accounts are not 
necessarily creating a cross-subsidy. 
 
 31. See generally Barbara Pacheco & Richard Sullivan, Interchange Fees in Credit and 
Debit Card Markets: What Role for Public Authorities?, 91 ECON. REV. 87, 93–100 (2006) 
(discussing current economic theory underpinning interchange fees). 
 32. Earlier scholarship examined the existence of cross-subsidization in transaction 
accounts during a period when regulations prohibited banks from paying interest on deposit 
accounts.  See, e.g., Sherrill Shaffer, Cross-Subsidization in Checking Accounts, 15 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 100, 103 (1984); see also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing this 
earlier scholarship).  However, the deposit interest rates are now largely unregulated.  See 
Prohibition Against Payment of Interest on Demand Deposits, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,015, at 42-
015-20 (July 18, 2011).  Thus, a re-examination of cross-subsidization in transaction 
accounts is warranted.  While many sources have made claims of regressive-cross 
subsidization (see supra notes 23 and 24), none of these sources contain detailed analysis to 
support such claims.  Their charges seem based primarily on the fact that low-balance 
accounts tend to incur overdraft fees while higher-balanced account do not.  See supra notes 
23–24, and 65.  Yet, as explained, in Part I, this is not enough to substantiate the existence 
of regressive cross-subsidization. 
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Part III examines transaction account market inefficiencies that might 
explain cross-subsidization among transaction accountholders.  It examines 
information deficiencies, regulations, and agency problems in transaction 
accounts.  It concludes that the current transaction account market provides 
theoretical explanations for both regressive and progressive cross-
subsidization among transaction accountholder groups.  For example, the 
Community Reinvestment Act
33
 might encourage banks to cross-subsidize 
some transaction accounts for poor consumers.  At the same time, bank 
management may subsidize rich accountholders in order to increase bank 
size, thereby maximizing management bonuses or creating financial 
institutions that are too big to fail. 
Part III also examines the impact of current account fee regulations, 
concluding that these regulations provide conflicting instruction to banks.  
On the one hand, the Truth in Savings Act
34
 and Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency regulations
35
 encourage banks to adopt high overdraft fees.  
On the other hand, recent Federal Reserve regulations make it more 
difficult for banks to charge overdraft fees on debit card transactions.
36
  
Because regulations conflict, it is difficult to determine the impact such 
regulations have on account pricing and cross-subsidization. 
Part IV examines existing empirical evidence concerning transaction 
account prices and costs.  It concludes that some consumers who pay 
numerous overdraft fees may pay more than the stand-alone cost of 
providing overdraft service to high overdraft accounts.  However, it also 
concludes that most high-balance accounts generate enough investment 
income to cover the incremental cost of transaction account services.  Thus, 
high-balance accounts are not receiving a subsidy from consumers who pay 
numerous overdraft fees.  Using account balance as a proxy for wealth, 
there is insufficient evidence to conclude that poor accountholders cross-
subsidize rich accountholders. 
Given the lack of conclusive evidence of regressive cross-
subsidization among transaction accountholders, Part V recommends that 
those seeking transaction account fee regulation look beyond the cross-
subsidization argument.  In particular, fee regulation could benefit from a 
coherent governing philosophy.  Laws and regulations adopted in the 
twentieth century encourage high overdraft fees.  This regulation was 
driven by the theory that avoidable penalty-type fees are more consumer-
friendly than unavoidable monthly maintenance fees.  More recent 
 
 33. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (Supp. 2011). 
 34. Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-13 (Supp. 2011). 
 35. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 (2012). 
 36. Id. at § 205.17. 
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regulation discourages overdraft fees.  This regulation is driven by a 
philosophy that upfront, but unavoidable, maintenance fees are more 
consumer friendly because they are more transparent than penalty-type 
fees.  Allegations of cross-subsidization simply hide this fundamental 
disagreement in account pricing philosophy.  A coherent theory of fee 
regulation could correct regulatory inconsistency and provide clear 
direction to banks.  Clearer instruction to banks could encourage clearer 
account choices for consumers. 
I. CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION 
Cross-subsidization is “[t]he provision of a good or service at a loss, 
which is met by the supplier from profits made on other goods and 
services.”
37
  When discussing implications of cross-subsidization in terms 
of social welfare, it is sometimes more useful to think about the groups of 
consumers who purchase bundles of goods or services.
38
  Does one 
consumer group pay higher prices in order to facilitate lower prices paid by 
another consumer group? 
In a perfectly efficient competitive market, cross-subsidization would 
not occur.  Consider a handyman that provides both plumbing and 
electrical services.  If the handyman charges those who need plumbing 
service a price that cross-subsidizes those who need electrical service, the 
consumers needing plumbing service will simply find another handyman 
who sells that service at a lower price.
39
  A profit maximizing handyman 
will provide plumbing service up to the point where the marginal cost of 
providing the service equals the marginal revenue generated by the service. 
A. Market Inefficiencies 
Cross-subsidization potentially occurs in markets that are not perfectly 
efficient.  Cross-subsidization can occur in at least three types of situations.  
First, cross-subsidization might occur because a service provider lacks 
 
 37. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 101 (3d ed. 2009); see also Gerald R. 
Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 966, 966 
(1975) (explaining that a cross-subsidy exists when the “price structure for the 
multicommodity enterprise ‘unduly’ favor[s] the consumers of one commodity at the 
expense of the purchasers of another commodity”). 
 38. Gerald R. Faulhaber & Stephen B. Levinson, Subsidy-Free Prices and Anonymous 
Equity, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 1083, 1083 (1981). 
 39. See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidy Analysis with More than Two Services, 1 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 441, 442 (2005) (“Customers of any product or service who faced 
prices that forced them to pay too much (thereby subsidizing a more favored customer 
group) would soon find competitors willing to offer equivalent service at lower prices.”). 
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sufficient information to price its services according to the costs of 
providing that service.
40
  For example, consider a simplified health 
insurance situation.  A group of similarly situated healthy consumers wants 
to purchase health insurance.  Because neither the consumers nor the 
insurance company can accurately predict who will become sick in the 
future, all the consumers pay the same price.  Eventually some people in 
the pool will become sick, while others remain healthy.  Thus, the healthy 
people subsidize the unhealthy people.
41
 
Second, cross-subsidization might occur because regulatory 
constraints prevent the service provider from transferring costs to some 
customers.
42
  For example, regulators seeking to ensure that all consumers 
have access to electricity might require an electricity supplier to service 
some consumers at a loss.  “This loss on some sales is financially feasible 
only when the [service provider] is permitted to make up for it by obtaining 
higher profits on its other sales.”
43
  In order to preserve this type of cross-
subsidization, the service provider must be “protected from price 
competition and free entry of new competitors in its other, more profitable 
markets (in which it charges the higher prices that subsidize the financing 
of the mandated low prices).”
44
 
Third, cross-subsidization might occur when agency problems arise.
45
  
Although directors and officers are often assumed to be maximizing 
 
 40. See Kenneth Fjell, A Cross-Subsidy Classification Framework, 21 J. PUB. POL’Y 
265, 273 (2001) (“[C]ross-subsidization may also take place inadvertently, for instance due 
to weak management accounting systems, possibly because of managerial limitations or 
because they are not judged cost-effective.  In other cases the cause of inadvertent cross-
subsidization might be more fundamental, as in multiservice firms with high sunk costs and 
low variable costs such as telecommunications.”); Shaffer, supra note 32, at 103 (noting that 
a bank’s failure to adjust the price of checking accounts based on the cost of providing those 
accounts “may result either from lack of information . . . , from a regulatory constraint, or 
from a profit incentive not to use the information”). 
 41. See Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 
U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 77 (2005) (describing health insurance as a system of “mutual aid” 
where “the majority of members who are fortunate enough to remain healthy subsidize the 
care of those members who become sick or suffer injuries”). 
 42. Shaffer, supra note 32, at 103. 
 43. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 275 
(Alex von Rosenburg et al. eds., 11th ed. 2009). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Agency problems arise when an agent is employed to act on behalf of a principle, 
for example, when management is employed by a company to act on behalf of a firm’s 
shareholders.  “If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason 
to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal.”  Michael 
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
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shareholder value,
46
 in some instances management may instead act in its 
own self-interest.  For example, if salaries of managers are positively 
correlated with firm size, managers may attempt to maximize their salaries 
by offering some products at a loss in order to increase the firm’s size of 
operations.
47
  On the other hand, management in some cases might also 
pursue “goals such as generating goodwill in personal relations unrelated to 
the business, [or] providing (unprofitable) services to charity.”
48
 
B. Establishing Cross-Subsidization 
Even when policymakers recognize conditions that might facilitate 
cross-subsidization, determining whether cross-subsidization occurs can be 
difficult.
49
  Because cross-subsidization analysis involves comparing the 
price a consumer pays with the cost of providing the service, the first step 
is determining the cost of providing the service.  While there are many 
possible ways to measure cost, the most widely accepted approach for 
measuring cross-subsidization is attributed to Gerald R. Faulhaber.
50
  He 
 
 46. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”); Kelli 
A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 796 (2011) (“Both 
directors and officers are supposed to working toward the goal of shareholder wealth 
maximization.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423 
(1993) (“Shareholder wealth maximization long has been the fundamental norm which 
guides U.S. corporate decisionmakers.”). 
 47. See Fjell, supra note 40, at 274. 
 48. Id. at 272. 
 49. David Heald, Contrasting Approaches to the ‘Problem’ of Cross Subsidy, 7 MGMT. 
ACCT. RES. 53, 54 (1996) (“[C]ross subsidies are hard to measure because they are hard to 
define, and hard to define because they are hard to measure.”). 
 50. See David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications: 
Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 
132 (1994) (citing “Faulhaber’s widely-accepted definition of a cross-subsidy”); Eric Ralph, 
Cross-subsidy: A Novice’s Guide to the Arcane 3 (July 27, 1992), available at 
http://www.ekonomicsllc.com/Ralph1992Cross-subsidy.pdf (noting that “the most widely 
accepted definition of cross-subsidy is commonly attributed to Faulhaber”); Mark Sievers & 
Brooks Albery, Strategic Allocation of Overhead: The Application of Traditional Predation 
Tests to Multiproduct Firms, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 757, 769 n.28 (1992) (“The most widely 
accepted economic definition of ‘subsidy-free’ pricing is [attributable to] . . . 
Faulhaber . . . .”).  See generally Faulhaber, supra note 37 (explaining the Faulhaber 
approach).  In spite of the wide academic acceptance of the Faulhaber approach, regulatory 
bodies have sometimes measured cross-subsidization by asking whether each consumer 
group covers its fully distributed costs.  See Warren G. Lavey, Innovative 
Telecommunications Services and the Benefit of the Doubt, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 51, 71 
(1990) (noting that the FCC used the fully distributed costs standard to set telephone rates 
prior to 1985).  The fully distributed costs approach has “been thoroughly discredited in 
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describes cross-subsidy as the absence of subsidy-free prices.  Subsidy-free 
prices require two conditions.  First, “revenues from the service must not 
exceed [the] stand alone cost” of providing that service.
51
  If one group 
pays more than the stand-alone cost of service, this group would be better 
off seeking an alternative arrangement from a provider that services only 
that group and prices according to costs.
52
  Second, “adding a service 
resulting in an incremental cost must also result in an increase in revenues 
that is at least as large [as the cost].”
53
  Each group of consumers must 
generate at least enough income to cover the marginal cost of service for 
that group.  If the two conditions are met, prices are considered subsidy-
free and no cross-subsidization exists. 
Faulhaber’s approach does not conceptualize a single subsidy-free 
price.  Rather, it allows for a range of subsidy-free prices “bounded on the 
lower end by average incremental cost and on the upper end by the per-unit 
stand-alone costs.”
54
 
Applying the Faulhaber approach can be challenging.  If two services 
have complementary or competing demands, it can be difficult to determine 
whether the revenue (including the net revenue changes attributable to the 
new service) exceeds the incremental cost of providing the new service.
55
  
In addition, it can sometimes be difficult to determine the hypothetical 
stand-alone cost of providing a service to a group of consumers.
56
 
C. Cross-Subsidization and Public Policy 
Even when cross-subsidization clearly occurs, we are left with 
questions about the appropriateness of a particular pricing structure.  In 
some circumstances, cross-subsidization may be viewed as socially 
desirable.  For example, regulated cross-subsidization may help rural users 
have access to reasonably-priced mail service—a result that some could 
 
legal, economic, and managerial accounting literature.”  Steve G. Parsons, The Economic 
Necessity of an Increased Subscriber Line Charge (SLC) in Telecommunications, 48 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 227, 229 (1996). 
 51. Fjell, supra note 40, at 269 (citing Faulhaber, supra note 37). 
 52. Ralph, supra note 50, at 3–4. 
 53. Fjell, supra note 40, at 268 (citing Faulhaber, supra note 37). 
 54. Mark L. Burton et al., Common Costs and Cross-Subsidies: Misestimation Versus 
Misallocation, 27 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 193, 194 (2009). 
 55. Fjell, supra note 40, at 268–69; see also ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 71–83 (1988) (discussing problems with 
defining and measuring marginal costs). 
 56. Heald, supra note 49, at 57–58 (describing problems with determining stand-alone 
costs). 
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view as socially desirable.
57
  On the other hand, cross-subsidization is 
sometimes viewed as fundamentally unfair because some consumers pay 
more than the stand-alone cost of the product.
58
  Absent some market flaw 
or restraint, competitors would enter the market and provide the overpaying 
group with service at a lower cost.  When the cost burden of a cross-
subsidy falls on a disadvantaged class, cross-subsidization is usually seen 
as undesirable.
59
  Finally, some oppose cross-subsidization because it can 
distort consumers’ decisions concerning the consumption of services.  If 
some services are subsidized, consumers may over-use these services and 
cause resources to be distributed inefficiently.
60
 
Tolerance of an existing cross-subsidization might also depend on the 
reason or reasons that it exists.  We might tolerate cross-subsidizations that 
occur due to lack of information because without sufficient information it 
would be difficult to correct the subsidy.
61
  In the case of regulation-
produced cross-subsidization, we might ask whether an existing price 
structure is helping those whom it was designed to help.  In the case of 
cross-subsidization caused by agency problems, we might ask whether the 
cross-subsidization is best corrected by efforts to eliminate the agency 
problem, or whether price regulation would be more effective. 
Just as cross-subsidies are not necessarily unfair, subsidy-free prices 
are not necessarily fair.
62
  Pricing structures that are not cross-subsidizing 
may still often result in one group of consumers bearing a larger share of 
the fixed costs associated with a particular service.  In these circumstances, 
price setters and policymakers might legitimately debate whether measures 
should be taken to encourage a different pricing structure. 
 
 57. See R. Richard Geddes, Policy Watch: Reform of the U.S. Postal Service, 19 J. 
ECON. PERSPS. 217, 224 (2005) (“The traditional argument is that a government monopoly 
over letter delivery will ensure that profits from dense, lucrative urban routes can cross-
subsidize money-losing rural routes, whereas private competitors might not provide delivery 
to remote areas.”). 
 58. Ralph, supra note 50, at 4 (“[C]ommon sense suggests it is unjust that a group 
should have to pay more than its standalone costs.”). 
 59. For example, in evaluating whether law student tuition unfairly cross-subsidized 
professor research, Professor Edward Rubin observed that “[t]he term ‘cross-subsidy,’ is a 
sophisticated way to express that most corrosive but unsophisticated of political or 
economic complaints—that ‘somebody is doing something bad to somebody else.’”  Edward 
Rubin, Should Law Schools Support Faculty Research?, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 139, 
140 (2008) (quoting Heald, supra note 49, at 54). 
 60. David B. Humphrey et al., Cost Recovery and Pricing of Payment Services: Theory, 
Methods, and Experience 3 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 1833, 1997). 
 61. In that situation it might be impossible to gather enough information to confirm the 
existence of a cross-subsidy. 
 62. Faulhaber, supra note 37, at 967 (noting that “a subsidy-free price structure is not 
necessarily welfare maximizing; nor are we entitled to assume that such price structures are 
morally superior to their subsidy-prone fellows on grounds of social justice”). 
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II. TRANSACTION ACCOUNTS 
Notwithstanding the ambiguous policy implications of cross-
subsidization, the repeated claim that transaction account pricing results in 
regressive cross-subsidization
63
 warrants closer inspection.  Using 
Faulhaber’s definition of cross-subsidy, transaction account pricing is 
subsidy-free if:  (1) no group of consumers pays more than the stand-alone 
cost of providing account services to that group of consumers, and (2) each 
group of consumers paid a price equal or greater to the incremental cost to 
the bank of providing the transaction account service.
64
  Both conditions 
require analysis of all costs incurred and the income earned by banks in 
providing transaction account services.  Yet some who assert that cross-
subsidization occurs in transaction account pricing focus primarily on a 
single source of income from transaction accounts:  the fees.
65
 
This Section discusses the structure of transaction accounts and how 
that structure impacts both the cost of providing account services and the 
prices paid for account services.  It explains that if banks priced transaction 
accounts according to the cost of providing those accounts, low-balance 
accounts (likely belonging to low-income consumers) would pay more fees 
because low-balance accounts generate little other income for the banks.  
However, the higher fees paid by low-balance accounts would not 
necessarily be cross-subsidizing high-balance accounts.  High-balance 
accounts allow banks to generate investment income that offsets the cost of 
providing account services. 
A. Banks’ Cost 
Banking laws define a “transaction account” as “a deposit or account 
on which the depositor or accountholder is permitted to make withdrawals 
by negotiable or transferable instrument, payment orders of withdrawal, 
telephone transfers, or other similar items for the purpose of making 
payments or transfers to third persons or others.”
66
  The term transaction 
account “includes demand deposits, negotiable order of withdrawal 
accounts, savings deposits subject to automatic transfers, and share draft 
accounts.”
67
  In essence, a bank holds money for a customer and uses that 
 
 63. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 64. See supra Part I.B. 
 65. See, e.g., Lieber & Martin, supra note 24, at A1 (“[P]eople who pay overdraft fees 
help subsidize the free accounts of those who do not.”); Salmon, supra note 24 (arguing that 
“the poor pay massive overdraft fees and thereby allow the rich to pay nothing”). 
 66. 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(C) (Supp. 2011). 
 67. Id.  Credit cards are not considered “transaction accounts” because credit cards 
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money to make payments at the customer’s direction. 
Banks incur a variety of costs in providing transaction account 
services.  “These costs reflect the expense of processing transactions; 
providing monthly statements; investing in payment system technology and 
software; paying the cost of tellers, ATMs, and online banking; staffing call 
centers; complying with a myriad of regulations; ensuring privacy and data 
protection; and preventing fraud and covering fraud losses.”
68
  Some banks 
also offer transaction accounts that pay interest on account balances.
69
  That 
interest must be considered a cost of the account. 
Of non-interest costs, payment processing expenses may be the largest 
cost.
70
  The payment processing costs associated with any given transaction 
account depend on the type of payments used and how many payments are 
made.  Even though many paper checks are “electronified” at some point in 
the check processing process,
71
 checks are still more costly to process than 
debit card payments or electronic payments.
72
  Other things being equal, 
transaction accounts with more payments are more costly for banks than 
accounts with fewer payments. 
Payment fraud and uncollected overdrafts also have the potential to be 
major expenses of transaction accounts.  Payment fraud arises when 
someone makes an unauthorized transaction using a payment device.  In 
some situations, banks can pass this loss back to either the customer who 
deposited the payment
73
 or the customer who allowed the fraudulent 
 
make payments using credit extended by the financial institution, rather than by debiting an 
account where a customer previously deposited money.  See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 200 
(5th ed. 2011). 
 68. Am. Bankers Ass’n, The Cost of a Checking Account (June 2010) available at at 
http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/press/CostofCheckingAccountsJune2010.pdf.  Some 
banks also offer debit card reward programs for consumers who use their card frequently.  
However, these programs are becoming less common.  Teresa Dixon Murray, After a Year 
of Changes, Banks Brace for More Rules, Reforms and Hits to the Bottom Line: Consumers 
Starting to See the Effects of Financial Overhaul Law, THE PLAIN DEALER, July 24, 2011, at 
D1. 
 69. TIMOTHY W. KOCH & S. SCOTT MACDONALD, BANK MANAGEMENT 401 (7th ed. 
2010). 
 70. Cf. Shaffer, supra note 32, at 100 (“Check processing costs account for a substantial 
portion of the total checking account expenses for commercial banks.”). 
 71. Stephen Quinn & William Roberds, The Evolution of the Check as a Means of 
Payment: A Historical Survey, 94(4) ECON. REV. 1, 23–24 (2008). 
 72.  KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 402–03; Amelia H. Boss, Convergence in 
Electronic Banking: Technological Convergence, Systems Convergence, Legal 
Convergence, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 63, 69 n.19 (2009). 
 73.  For example, if a customer deposits a check that is later returned as unpaid, a 
depositary bank that has already provisionally credited the customer’s account may charge 
back the amount of the check to the customer.  U.C.C. § 4-214(c) (2011). 
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payment to be made from his or her account.
74
  Sometimes, however, legal 
rules or practical considerations require that the bank bears the loss.  One 
study found that in 2006, banks incurred $1.66 billion in fraud losses 
associated with payments by check, debit card, or ACH system.
75
  
Uncollected overdrafts arise when an accountholder overdraws the account 
and fails to deposit sufficient money to cover the overdraft.  If a bank is 
unable to collect the balance through some other means, the bank must 
charge-off the account.
76
  An FDIC Survey found that in 2006, banks’ 
charge-offs associated with deposit accounts amounted to “12.6 percent of 
total gross loan and lease charge-offs reported.”
77
 
B. Banks’ Income 
While banks incur costs in providing transaction accounts, they also 
earn money from those accounts.  There are three ways banks can earn 
money from transaction accounts. 
First, banks can lend out the deposited money, thereby earning 
interest.
78
  Indeed, this is often thought of as the quintessential business of 
banking:  borrowing money from depositors at a low interest rate and then 
lending it out at a higher interest rate.  The amount a bank can earn from 
lending deposits depends on a number of factors.  Regulation requires that 
banks hold part of their deposits in reserve.
79
  Banks must hold reserve 
amounts in cash or in accounts at the Federal Reserve or a correspondent 
bank.
80
  Thus, banks are not free to lend all deposits.  To the extent that a 
bank can lend deposits, the amount earned depends on the interest rate 
spread.  The bank must lend at a rate higher than the rate it pays the 
depositor.  Deposit availability, loan demand, and future interest rate 
 
 74. For example, a customer whose negligence results in a thief stealing his checkbook 
and cashing forged checks may be partly responsible for the loss.  U.C.C. § 3-406(b). 
 75. Richard J. Sullivan, Can Smart Cards Reduce Payments Fraud and Identity Theft?, 
93 ECON. REV. 1, 38 (2008). 
 76. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 266 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “charge off” as “[t]o 
treat (an account receivable) as a loss or expense because payment is unlikely; to treat as a 
bad debt”). 
 77. FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS 62 (2008), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/overdraft/FDIC138_Report_Final_v508.pdf 
[hereinafter FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY]. 
 78. See KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 403. 
 79. Regulation D, 12 C.F.R. §§ 204.1-.10 (2012).  The amount of deposits each bank 
must reserve depends on the amount of deposits held by the bank and the type of account in 
which the deposit is held.  Id. § 204.4. 
 80. See id. § 204.5.  Banks earn relatively low rates of interest on deposits maintained at 
the Federal Reserve.  Id. § 204.10. 
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forecasts all impact the interest rate spread.
81
  Assuming that neither the 
reserve requirement nor the interest rate spread makes lending unprofitable, 
the larger the average balance of a transaction account, the more a bank can 
earn by lending. 
Second, banks generate income by charging fees on transaction 
accounts.
82
  As previously discussed, banks employ a wide variety of 
account fees.
83
  A Government Accountability Office study found that in 
2006, “consumers paid over $36 billion in various fees associated with 
checking and savings accounts at depository institutions.”
84
 
Third, transaction accounts can increase the demand for other bank 
products and services.
85
  In some instances, when a bank entices a customer 
to open a transaction account it may increase the likelihood that the bank 
will be able to sell that same customer other products and services.
86
  For 
example, transaction accountholders often choose to purchase checks from 
their bank.
87
  The more transaction accounts a bank maintains, the more 
checks the bank is likely to sell.  Such cross-selling opportunities might 
extend to bank products that are not directly linked to the transaction 
account—like home mortgages, credit cards, and investment products.  At 
least some banks pursue transaction accounts as an opportunity to cross-sell 
other products.
88
  Banks may find cross-selling more fruitful when targeted 
toward wealthy accountholders.
89
  Nevertheless, research suggests that 
 
 81. See Nathan Powell, What the Yield Curve Does (and Doesn’t) Tell Us, FDIC FYI: 
AN UPDATE ON EMERGING ISSUES IN BANKING (Feb. 22, 2006), 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2006/022206fyi.html. 
 82. See KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 403. 
 83. See supra notes 3–10 and accompanying text. 
 84. GAO, BANK FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. 
 85. See Mike Branton, StrategyCorps, What to Do with Unprofitable Retail Checking 
Accounts? (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.ababj.com/white-papers-2010/what-to-do-
with-unprofitable-retail-checking-accounts.html. 
 86. See KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 22, 655 (noting banks’ ability to cross-
sell consumer products). 
 87. Cf. Lee Conrad, Checks: Small Check Printer Goes Against Grain: Shrugs off 
Concerns of Shrinking Check Volume, BANK TECH. NEWS, Oct. 3, 2005, at 1 (discussing 
bank profit margins on check sales). 
 88. See Steve Garmhausen, Big Banks Gaining Retail Customers in Workplaces, AM. 
BANKER, Dec. 29, 2010, at 2 (discussing Comercia Inc.’s efforts to target “select employee 
groups” for transaction accounts and then cross-sell other products); Rick Rothacker, Bank 
of America’s Plan: More Cross-Selling, Smaller Balance Sheet, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, 
Sept. 14, 2010 (discussing Bank of America’s efforts to cross-sell investment products to 
bank customers). 
 89. See Shibo Li et al., Cross-Selling the Right Product to the Right Customer at the 
Right Time, 48 J. MARKETING RES. 683, 694 (2011) (“Higher income increases the purchase 
propensity [regardless of consumers’ state of financial maturity].”); Leonard J. Paas et al., 
Acquisition Patterns of Financial Products: A Longitudinal Investigation, 28 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 229, 237 (2007) (finding that “households with high incomes and assets are over-
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banks’ cross-selling efforts are unlikely to be consistently successful.
90
 
In other instances, a transaction account might increase the demand 
for services that are not purchased directly by the accountholder.  For 
example, when a transaction account customer uses his debit card to make 
a purchase, the merchant will pay an “interchange” fee that in part flows 
back to the accountholder’s bank.
91
  The more customers want to use debit 
cards, the more merchants may be willing to pay for debit card 
processing.
92
  And the more merchants that accept the card, the more 
customers will want to use the card.
93
  In this way, the “network effect” of 
having more consumers using debit cards produces value for the bank.
94
  If 
banks are able to profit from interchange fees, then, other things being 
equal, transaction accounts with more debit card transactions will be more 
profitable than those with fewer debit card transactions. 
Congress, however, recently limited banks’ ability to use the network 
effect to generate income from consumer transaction accounts.  Under a 
provision of the Dodd-Frank Act popularly known as the Durbin 
Amendment, the Federal Reserve gained power to regulate debit card 
interchange fees—the fees banks charge to merchants for debit card 
processing.
95
  Under the Durbin Amendment, interchange fees must “be 
reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect 
to the transaction.”
96
  In particular the Federal Reserve must distinguish 
between “the incremental cost incurred by an issuer for the role of the 
 
represented in segments with high [financial] product penetrations”); Michael S. Barr, An 
Inclusive, Progressive National Savings and Financial Services Policy, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 161, 170–71 (2007) (noting that “lower-income households are unlikely to be the first 
place [financial institutions] look for assets and cross-selling opportunities”). 
 90. See Rich Weissman, Upscale Marketing: It’s Not What You Think, 89 HOOSIER 
BANKER 1, 2 (2005) (stating that “[m]ost traditionally defined upscale customers tend [to] be 
either among the most profitable or the most unprofitable customers in the banks (and not in 
the middle)”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services 
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 
215, 432–33 (stating that “reports confirm that big banks have had very limited success in 
cross-selling different types of financial services to consumers”). 
 91. Tim Mead et al., The Role of Interchange Fees on Debit and Credit Card 
Transactions in the Payments System, ECON. BRIEF NO. 11-05 (FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
RICHMOND) (2011). 
 92. Benjamin Klein et al., Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics 
of Payment Card Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 580 (2006). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 577 (explaining that “network effects” occur when the supply and demand of 
one product impact the demand of another related product, for example, where a 
“newspaper publisher lowers reader prices and thereby increases readership, [thus] 
increas[ing] demand for advertising in the newspaper”). 
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a) (2011). 
 96. Id. § 1693o-2(a)(2). 
HILL_FINAL; (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  10:30 PM 
84 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
issuer in the authorization, clearance, or settlement of a particular 
electronic debit transaction,” and “other costs incurred by an issuer which 
are not specific to a particular electronic debit transaction.”
97
  The Federal 
Reserve can consider incremental costs in setting the fee, but cannot 
consider other costs.
98
  The Federal Reserve’s rules implementing the 
Durbin Amendment limit debit interchange fees to no more than “21 cents” 
plus “5 basis points multiplied by the value of the transaction.”
99
 
Congress enacted the Durbin Amendment based on concerns that 
“retailers and consumers [were] bear[ing] a disproportionate amount of 
costs of the debit card system.”
100
  Others challenge the conclusion that 
merchant fees were subsidizing consumer accounts, arguing that the 
interchange fees were likely the result of efficient pricing strategies.
101
  In 
any event, because future debit interchange fees must be focused on the 
incremental cost of providing the service, it seems unlikely that banks will 
be able to generate significant profits by encouraging transaction 
accountholders to use debit cards thus boosting the demand for merchant 
processing.  As Professor Richard Epstein states, “[t]he implicit subtext of 
[the Durbin Amendment] is that the banks can recoup the revenues they 
lose in debit interchange from their own customers, in the terms of higher 
rates for the various services they supply.”
102
  In other words, banks must 
 
 97. Id. § 1693o-2(a)(4). 
 98. Id.; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Paradox of the Durbin 
Amendment: How Monopolies are Offered Constitutional Protections Denied to 
Competitive Firms, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1307, 1340 (2011) (noting that the Durbin Amendment 
is “[a] system of price controls that is keyed to variable (or incremental) costs . . . [and] does 
not afford the competitive firm any more opportunity to recover its fixed costs than [a] 
public utility”). 
 99. 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (2012).  The interchange regulations do not apply to financial 
institutions that have less than $10 billion in assets.  Id. § 235.5(a).  However, many believe 
that market pressures and processing network policies will prevent smaller banks from 
charging higher interchange fees.  See Oversight of Dodd-Frank Implementation: A 
Progress Report by the Regulators at the Half-Year Mark: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 21 (2011) (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke, 
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.) (“By the statute, the smaller 
institutions will be exempt from these restrictions, but there is the possibility that either 
because merchants would not accept the more expensive cards or because networks would 
not be willing to have a two-tiered pricing system, it is possible that in practice they would 
not be exempt from the lower interchange fee.”). 
 100. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1164–65 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming 
the holding that the Durbin Amendment was rationally related to Congress’s concerns). 
 101. See Epstein, supra note 98, at 1314–24 (arguing that if debit cards were subsidized 
by cash and check customers, merchants would strive to eliminate the subsidies to increase 
their customer base, but the reverse is seen in practice). 
 102. Epstein, supra note 98, at 1326.  Indeed, only politicians, including Senator Durbin, 
seemed shocked when banks did raise their fees after the Durbin Amendment.  See Eryk J. 
Wachnik, “The Durbin Tax” and How the Banks Tried to Insure Their Bottom Line, 24 
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look to the traditional sources of account income:  investment of deposits 
and fees. 
C. The Natural Fee Difference 
The fact that banks’ primary sources of account income are 
investment and fees creates a situation where banks may efficiently price 
accounts differently based on the account balance.  If a bank prices each 
transaction account to cover its costs, the bank may charge high-balance 
accounts fewer fees because these accounts are capable of producing 
investment income.
103
  In contrast, banks may charge low-balance accounts 
more fees because investment income from these accounts will not cover 
the cost of providing transaction services.
104
  Economics professors 
Timothy Koch and Scott MacDonald note that this type of pricing creates a 
“caste system of banking.”
105
  Under such a system: 
Large depositors receive the highest rates, pay the lowest fees, 
and often get free checking.  They do not wait in long teller lines 
and they receive more attention from their personal banker.  
When they call a bank representative, they often quickly get a 
live person on the line.  Small depositors, by contrast, earn lower 
rates, if any, on their small balances and pay higher fees, with 
less personal service.  When these customers call their bank—
particularly at large, transactions-based organizations—they will 
be routinely routed from one electronic response to another and 
will wait long periods to visit with an actual person.
106
 
When banks charge fees for low-balance accounts, some consumers may 
turn to fringe financial service providers instead of banks.
107
 
While a pricing system that extracts fees from low-balance 
accountholders may seem unfair to some,
108
 it does not necessarily imply 
 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 318, 323–25 (2011). 
 103. Of course, such a pricing structure would not be the only rational way for a bank to 
price a high-balance transaction account.  A bank might instead choose to charge fees for 
high-balance accounts and then pay the same accounts a higher interest rate on the deposited 
balance. 
 104. This effect could be achieved with a variety of pricing structures.  Customers could 
be charged monthly fees depending on the balance of their account.  Alternatively, a bank 
could charge all accounts the same fees, but pay interest depending on the account balance.  
Alternatively still, a bank could charge fees that are likely to be paid only by those with low 
balances. 
 105. KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 403. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Barr, supra note 25, at 177–81 (noting that when accounts have high fees they 
may make little “economic sense” for some people). 
 108. See Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial 
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the existence of cross-subsidization among consumer groups.  Under a 
transaction account pricing structure that charges fees according to costs, 
the poor may pay more fees because their accounts have lower balances 
and generate less investment income.  On the other hand, a transaction 
account pricing structure that charges low-balance accounts more fees than 
high-balance accounts is not necessarily subsidy-free.  In any event, a 
thorough examination of cross-subsidization among transaction 
accountholders must evaluate not only account fees, but also income 
generated by banks’ investment of deposits. 
III. TRANSACTION ACCOUNT MARKET INEFFICIENCIES 
Keeping in mind both fee and investment income from transaction 
accounts, this Part explores market inefficiencies that could theoretically 
explain cross-subsidization among transaction accountholders.  It focuses 
on the factors, identified in Part I.A, that have potential to produce cross-
subsidization:  information deficiencies, regulatory constraints, and agency 
problems.
109
  It concludes that the transaction account market has features 
that could partially explain both regressive and progressive cross-
subsidization.  In particular, market entry restraints, interest rate regulation, 
fee regulation, and the Community Reinvestment Act all have potential to 
affect banks’ transaction account pricing. 
A. Information Deficiencies 
First, cross-subsidization might occur because banks lack the 
information to price each transaction account strictly according to cost.
110
  
At a minimum, banks do not know beforehand exactly which transaction 
accounts will result in overdraft charge-offs.  While historical data can help 
banks predict the rate of charge-offs among various consumer groups, some 
high credit risk consumers will not result in charge-offs.  Conversely, some 
low credit risk consumers will result in charge-offs.  Thus, pricing 
according to credit risk will not eliminate cross-subsidization. 
 
Protection Act’s ‘Abusive’ Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 126 (2011) (stating 
that because “[t]he most frequent users of overdraft programs are lower-income individuals 
with less financial sophistication,” account pricing exploits low-income individuals). 
 109. In analyzing potential market imperfections, this Part, like the Article more broadly, 
focuses on market imperfections that could produce cross-subsidization among transaction 
account consumers, rather than cross-subsidization involving transaction account consumers 
and other bank customers. 
 110. See Gregory F. Udell, Pricing Returned Check Charges Under Asymmetric 
Information, 18 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 495, 496 (1986) (“[I]t is not at all clear 
that bankers have more than a very imperfect knowledge of [deposit] costs themselves.” ). 
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Banks also lack advanced notice of the type and number of payments 
a transaction account consumer will make in any given month.  Banks 
could cope with this lack of information by imposing a cost for each 
transaction.
111
  However, such a pricing practice could be prohibitively 
expensive to administer.
112
  In addition, because the full cost of each item 
could depend on the amount of fixed costs assigned to each item, such 
pricing would require an accurate projection of the total number of 
transactions processed. 
Finally, banks lack advanced notice of the amount of money that will 
be in a transaction account at any given time.  Banks can partially 
counteract this lack of information by paying interest calculated daily.  
However, for low-balance accounts, this mechanism will be ineffective in 
recouping costs.  For those accounts, banks could charge monthly access 
fees depending on the account balance.  This pricing mechanism is unlikely 
to be perfectly efficient because banks would have to divide accountholders 
into an administratively reasonable number of groups. 
In sum, information deficiencies are likely to lead to some cross-
subsidization among transaction accountholders.  Determining whether this 
cross-subsidization is progressive or regressive would be difficult because 
the crux of the problem is a lack of knowledge.  Furthermore, completely 
eliminating cross-subsidization caused by information deficiencies is likely 
to be cost-prohibitive or impossible. 
B. Regulation 
In contrast, any cross-subsidization caused by regulation should be 
more easily identified—especially to the extent that specific regulations are 
designed to impact banks’ transaction account pricing.  This Part discusses 
the numerous regulatory constraints that could lead to cross-subsidization 
among transaction accountholders.  
It begins by examining regulations that limit entry into the transaction 
account market.  Such restrictions could allow banks to overprice some (or 
all) transaction accounts.   
This Part then examines interest rate regulations.  Although interest 
rate regulations likely caused cross-subsidization in the past, there are few 
current restrictions on the interest rates banks may pay on transaction 
accounts. 
Next, this Part examines fee regulations.  Here, examination of the 
 
 111. Shaffer, supra note 32, at 100–01. 
 112. See id. at 103 (noting that a per-check charge could “entail[] additional costs, such 
as record-keeping and tabulating expenses”). 
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regulations reveals a somewhat surprising conflict.  The Truth in Savings 
Act and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency regulations encourage 
banks to adopt high penalty-type fees like overdraft and return check 
charges.  These laws, coupled with the market entry restrictions and 
consumer choice inefficiencies could lead to over-pricing of overdraft fees.  
On the other hand, a new Federal Reserve regulation limits banks’ ability to 
charge overdrafts on debit card transactions.  This regulation seems aimed 
at discouraging debit overdraft fees, thereby ameliorating the harm caused 
by consumer tendencies to inefficiently choose transaction account 
products. 
Finally, this Part examines regulations aimed at requiring or 
encouraging banks to provide transaction account services to low-income 
consumers.  In the federal arena, the Community Reinvestment Act might 
encourage banks to provide progressive cross-subsidization of some 
transaction accounts.  Yet its weak enforcement mechanism suggests its 
influence is likely limited. 
In sum, while there are strong arguments that the transaction account 
market is inefficient, it is difficult to argue that these inefficiencies 
uniformly promote regressive cross-subsidization among transaction 
accountholders. 
i. Market Entry Restraints 
As an initial matter, for regulation to require or encourage cross-
subsidization, there must be a mechanism that allows banks to overprice 
some transaction accounts.  If the market for transaction accounts was 
competitive, overpricing of some transaction accounts would lead 
competitors to offer the same service at a lower price.  The overpaying 
customers would then move to the less costly alternatives.  Overpricing is 
likely to occur only when consumers are limited in their options.
113
 
There is reason to believe that regulatory barriers limit competition in 
the transaction account market.  Transaction accounts offered by banks are 
particularly attractive to consumers because the accounts are insured by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
114
  Non-banks cannot offer 
FDIC-insured accounts.
115
  The FDIC and other bank regulators tightly 
 
 113. See supra notes 39, 44, and accompanying text. 
 114. Single-owner interest bearing transaction accounts are insured up to $250,000.  12 
U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (Supp. 2011).  Most non-interest bearing transaction accounts are 
currently fully insured.  12 C.F.R. § 330.16 (2012) (providing unlimited coverage through 
December 31, 2012). 
 115. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a)(1) (Supp. 2011) (providing that “any depository institution 
which is engaged in the business of receiving deposits . . . upon application to and 
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control entry into the banking market.
116
  Capital requirements,
117
 activities 
restrictions,
118
 and other regulations also pose significant barriers to entry 
and expansion.  Data show that a significant portion of deposits are held by 
a relatively small number of banks.  In 2011, the ten largest U.S. banks 
held 44% of all domestic deposits.
119
  Large banks do tend to pay lower 
interest rates on transaction accounts
120
 and charge higher fees
121
 than their 
smaller competitors.
122
  Studies suggest that larger banks may “have gained 
pricing power over deposit services in regional markets.”
123
  Regulations 
 
examination by the [FDIC] and approval by the Board of Directors, may become an insured 
depository institution”); Id. § 1813(c)(1) (2006) (defining a depository institution to include 
only “bank[s] or savings association[s]”). 
 116. See generally RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. 
MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 73–76 (4th ed. 2009) 
(describing the process for receiving regulatory approval to charter a bank).  In recent years, 
the FDIC has been particularly stingy with new (de novo) bank charters.  See Barbara A. 
Rehm, Editor at Large: FDIC Set to End De Novo Dry Spell, AM. BANKER, Dec. 2, 2010, at 
1. 
 117. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 325.3, 325.103 (2012). 
 118. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1841–42 (Supp. 2011). 
 119. As of June 30, 2011, the ten largest banks as measured by total domestic deposits 
were:  Bank of America, National Association; Wells Fargo Bank, National Association; 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association; Citibank, National Association; U.S. Bank 
National Association; PNC Bank, National Association; TD Bank, National Association; 
SunTrust Bank; Branch Banking and Trust Company; and The Bank of New York Mellon.  
They held $3.64 trillion of the $8.25 trillion domestic deposits.  See  Summary of Deposits 
Data, FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/ (follow “Summary Tables” hyperlink; then follow 
“Top 50 Commercial Banks and Savings Institutions by Deposits” hyperlink; then select 
June 30, 2011 in “Data as of” dropdown menu; then select “Run Report” hyperlink) (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2012). 
 120. See Richard J. Rosen, Banking Market Conditions and Deposit Interest Rates, 31 J. 
OF BANKING & FIN. 3862, 3864 (2007) (concluding that between 1998 and 2004, “markets 
with a larger share of mega-banks [were] less competitive than markets with a larger share 
of mid-size banks, all else equal”). 
 121. See GAO, BANK FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (“Large institutions—those with 
more than $1 billion in assets—on average charged more for the majority of fees than 
midsized or small institutions—those with assets of $100 million to $1 billion and less than 
$100 million, respectively.”); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ANNUAL 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON RETAIL FEES AND SERVICES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 8 
(2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/2003fees.pdf 
(finding that “[o]f the fourteen fees for which comparisons are available . . ., multistate 
banks charged significantly higher fees in eight cases and in no case charged a significantly 
lower fee”). 
 122. There are several possible explanations for the pricing differences between small 
and large banks.  See infra notes 274–78 and accompanying text. 
 123. Wilmarth, supra note 90, at 295; see also Maurice E. Stucke, Lessons From the 
Financial Crisis, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 335–36 (2010) (“[C]onsumers may be paying 
supracompetitive overdraft fees to large financial institutions, which in turn distribute the 
rents unequally (namely to the CEOs and other senior executives).”) (citation omitted). 
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that limit the entry and expansion in banking could potentially result in a 
market (or markets) where banks are able to charge supracompetitive prices 
to transaction accountholders. 
General market power in transaction accounts would only explain why 
banks could overcharge all transaction accountholders.  However, it may 
well be that the regulatory restraints in the transaction account market 
affect different transaction account services differently.  Non-bank 
competition for transaction account-type services is partly determined by 
the account type.  For those consumers capable of maintaining a high 
account balance, mutual funds are to some extent a competitive product to 
bank transaction accounts.
124
  For those consumers who do not maintain a 
high account balance, check cashing services, money orders, and prepaid 
cards are to some extent competitive products for transaction accounts.
125
  
If mutual funds are a more effective competitor than fringe financial 
service providers, then regulatory restraints may allow banks to reap 
supracompetitive profits from low-balance accounts, but not high-balance 
accounts. 
If, however, restraints on entry and expansion in the banking market 
allow banks supracompetitive profits on all types of transaction accounts, 
then other factors must influence banks’ decisions to engage in cross-
subsidization. 
ii. Interest Rate Regulation 
Regulation of the amount of interest banks can pay to transaction 
accountholders could force or encourage banks to engage in cross-
subsidization.  Indeed, previous scholars have concluded that historic 
interest rate restrictions led to cross-subsidization.  Today, however, banks 
are free to pay interest on transaction accounts.  Thus, interest rate 
regulation can no longer be claimed as a source of cross-subsidization. 
During the Great Depression, Congress enacted a law prohibiting all 
banks from paying interest on demand deposit accounts.
126
  Because of this 
limitation, most consumers paid few transaction account fees.
127
  In the 
 
 124. See infra notes 126–138 and accompanying text (discussing how the development 
of mutual funds led some bank customers to move their money from transaction accounts). 
 125. See infra notes 293–297 (discussing prepaid cards as a substitute for transaction 
accounts) and notes 313–328 (discussing payday loans as a substitute for transaction 
accounts). 
 126. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §10, 48 Stat. 162, 181 (1933).  The law 
also limited banks’ ability to pay interest on other types of deposits.  Id. 
 127. In 1987, the General Accounting Office surveyed 1662 randomly selected banks 
and thrifts about the current and historic terms of their checking accounts.  U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-87-70, BANKING SERVICES: CHANGES IN FEES AND DEPOSIT 
HILL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  10:30 PM 
2012] TRANSACTION ACCOUNT FEES 91 
 
1970s, however, the banking environment changed.
128
  As interest rates 
rose, consumers became frustrated with the paltry rates of interest they 
earned on bank deposits.
129
  Securities markets stepped up to fill the 
demand for better returns by offering mutual funds.
130
  Rather than simply 
watch their deposit bases disappear,
131
 banks lobbied Congress to remove 
the interest rate caps that kept them from competing with mutual funds.  
Congress responded by passing the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act.
132
  Among other things, this Act phased out 
many of the restrictions on the amount of interest that banks could pay 
depositors.
133
  In 1982, the Garn-St Germain Act accelerated the phase-outs 
and allowed banks to offer insured money market deposit accounts without 
interest rate restrictions.
134
  The result of interest rate deregulation was a 
sudden jump in the interest rates banks paid for transaction accounts.  
Banks that had been paying interest rates “of around 5 1/4% were suddenly 
paying in excess of 15% to attract or merely maintain deposits.”
135
  Banks 
 
ACCOUNT INTEREST RATES SINCE DEREGULATION 13 (1987), available at 
http://www.legistorm.com/showFile/L2xzX3Njb3JlL2dhby9wZGYvMTk4Ny83/ 
ful15873.pdf [hereinafter GAO, CHANGES IN FEES AND DEPOSIT ACCOUNT INTEREST RATES].  
The survey found that in 1977 “about 35 percent of banks offered a free noninterest-bearing 
checking account.  Another 59 percent carried no fees if a minimum balance was 
maintained.”  Id. at 22.  At that time, some banks did not even charge fees for services like 
printing checks, stopping payment on a check, or returning a check for insufficient funds.  
Id. at 32–34. 
 128. CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 116, at 24–25. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. “The mutual fund became the most important financial innovation and 
money substitute by offering many of the deposit services of banks without imposing the 
costs of reserve requirements and federal deposit insurance.”  Timothy A. Canova, The 
Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to Free-Market 
Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1314 (1995). 
 131. See Laurie S. Goodman & Sherrill Shaffer, The Economics of Deposit Insurance: A 
Critical Evaluation of Proposed Reforms, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 145, 152 (1984) (“[A]s interest 
rates climbed in the late 1970’s, money market mutual funds, which had no interest rate 
limitations, grew from $43 billion at the end of 1979 to $242 billion in November 1982.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 132. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-221, tit. II, 94 Stat. 132, 142–45 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.). 
 133.  See id. § 204. 
 134.  Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 326–27, 96 
Stat. 1469, 1500–01 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503).  The phase-outs were completed 
by 1985.  See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal 
Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1133, 1143 (1990). 
 135. Alvin C. Harrell, Deposit Insurance Issues and the Implications for the Structure of 
the American Financial System, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 179, 188 (1993); see also Eric J. 
Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure of Legislative Methodology, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 
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also increasingly turned to transaction account fees to generate income.
136
 
The adjustment in account pricing following interest rate deregulation 
led many scholars to conclude that the interest rate regulation had 
encouraged cross-subsidization among groups of transaction 
accountholders.
137
  “The popular view was that the 20 percent of bank 
customers with the largest deposit balances subsidized the 80 percent with 
lower balances.”
138
 
In an environment where banks could not pay interest on transaction 
accounts, large depositors could be overcharged (by not receiving interest 
for the use of their money) because there were few alternatives.  Banks 
sought to evade the effects of the interest rate regulation by offering 
“implicit interest”—increased services to accountholders.
139
  Banks offered 
accountholders “free bank-by-mail services, gifts ranging from teddy bears 
to toasters, and convenient neighborhood branch offices.”
140
  This 
competition through increased service was inefficient.
141
  Empirical studies 
concluded that banks were not successful in fully compensating some high-
balance accounts.
142
 
 
1281, 1292 (1994) (“When the artificial regulatory constraints on the price of deposits 
disappeared . . . deposit interest rates soared . . . .”). 
 136. Gouvin, supra note 135, at 1292 (“In light of the shrinking interest rate spread, 
noninterest income, in the form of fees and charges, began to play an increasingly important 
role in the finances of banks.”). See generally GAO, CHANGES IN FEES AND DEPOSIT 
ACCOUNT INTEREST RATES, supra note 127 (reporting a survey of banks and thrifts regarding 
bank account fees between 1977 and 1985). 
 137. See Shaffer, supra note 32 (reporting an empirical investigation concluding that in 
an environment where interest rates were regulated, some transaction accounts subsidized 
other transaction accounts). 
 138. KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 403; see also PETER S. ROSE & SYLVIA C. 
HUDGINS, BANK MANAGEMENT & FINANCIAL SERVICES 396–97 (7th ed. 2008) (describing 
how interest rate regulation led to non-price competition for transaction accounts). 
 139. STEPHEN H. AXILROD ET AL., STAFF OF THE BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS., THE IMPACT OF THE PAYMENT OF INTEREST ON DEMAND DEPOSITS 1 (1977), available 
at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/books/ipidd_bog_19770131.pdf (“Bank 
efforts to attract such deposits have mainly involved the payment of implicit interest in the 
form of charges below cost for services performed.”); Richard Startz, Competition and 
Interest Rate Ceilings in Commercial Banking, 98 Q. J. ECON. 255, 257  (1983)  [hereinafter, 
Startz, Competition and Interest Rate Ceilings] (“Price controls are evaded fully or in part as 
agents substitute quality, advertising, or other forms of nonprice competition in place of 
forbidden, open price competition.”); Richard Startz, Implicit Interest on Demand Deposits, 
5 J. MONETARY ECON. 515, 515 (1979) (finding that this “rate of implicit interest appears to 
be well below the competitive rate on deposits . . . [but] also well above zero”). 
 140.  ROSE & HUDGINS, supra note 138, at 396. 
 141. See id. at 397 (noting the market distortion of service-based competition); KOCH & 
MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 403 (discussing the cross-subsidization). 
 142. Startz, Competition and Interest Rate Ceilings in Commercial Banking, supra note 
139, at 259 (“[S]tudies all tend to show that banks return to depositors between one third 
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With the overpayment by high-balance accounts, banks could afford 
to provide account services to unprofitable low-balance accounts.
143
  But 
over-payment by high-balance accountholders would not necessarily have 
flowed to low-balance accountholders.  A bank seeking to maximize 
shareholder value would have preferred to retain the overpayments as 
monopolistic profits.
144
  Nevertheless, in an environment where interest was 
prohibited, banks may have found it administratively difficult to 
simultaneously discourage small deposits and encourage large deposits.
145
  
Thus, high-balance accounts cross-subsidized low-balance accounts while 
interest was prohibited. 
It seems reasonable to postulate that the cross-subsidization caused by 
the prohibition on interest was progressive—meaning that it benefitted low-
income consumers (and perhaps even middle-income consumers) at the 
expense of high-income consumers.  Of course, not all low-balance 
accounts were held by low-income consumers.  For example, some 
relatively wealthy depositors may have maintained second or third accounts 
with low balances for special purposes.
146
  At the same time, “large 
depositors [may have been] more sensitive to the costs of holding idle 
demand deposits” and aggressively sought alternatives.
147
  Yet overall, it is 
reasonable to theorize that under interest rate regulation, wealthy depositors 
cross-subsidized low-income consumers.
148
 
 
and two thirds of the yield from investing deposit funds.”). 
 143. See CASKEY, supra note 29, at 88 (“The low competitive pressures in this 
[regulated] environment enabled banks to offer many services on which they lost money, 
making it up by paying below-market interest rates on large deposits.  Among the money-
losing services most banks offered was to permit depositors to maintain checking accounts 
with very small balances and low fees or no fees.”). 
 144. See William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidies, Third-Party-Payments, and Cross-
Subsidization: America’s Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 279, 352 
(2009) (“Some providers are able to maintain a clientele that pays the rates necessary for 
cross-subsidization but, in fact, simply keep supracompetitive profits for themselves.”). 
 145. Cf. AXILROD ET AL., supra note 139, at 2 (stating that if banks were allowed to offer 
interest on transaction accounts “banks would be motivated to gauge more carefully their 
costs of demand deposit services”). 
 146. See Glenn B. Canner & Ellen Maland, Basic Banking, 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 255, 
255 (1987) (noting that some low-balance accounts were secondary, less-used accounts that 
the accountholder maintained simply because of the low cost). 
 147. AXILROD ET AL., supra note 139, at 25. 
 148. See Edward L. Rubin, The Lifetime Banking Controversy: Putting Deregulation to 
Work for the Low-Income Consumer, 67 IND. L.J. 213, 215 (1992) (noting that deregulation 
“worked to the disadvantage of low-income consumers [because] these consumers tended to 
have small account balances”).  Elimination of the cross-subsidy likely led some consumers 
with small-balances to close their accounts.  See CASKEY, supra note 29, at 90 
(“Undoubtedly, in response to fee increases, some consumers with small bank accounts 
decided that it was no longer worthwhile to maintain bank accounts.”); GAO, CHANGES IN 
FEES AND DEPOSIT ACCOUNT INTEREST RATES, supra note 127, at 3 (noting that although 
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Any cross-subsidization that existed prior to the 1980s was reduced 
when mutual funds began to offer a viable alternative to transaction 
accounts and Congress began to allow banks to pay interest on transaction 
accounts.
149
  However, the deregulation was limited.  Regulations 
continued to prohibit banks from paying interest on corporate demand 
deposit accounts.
150
  It is possible that this narrower restriction, like the 
broader interest rate regulation before it, led to some cross-subsidization.  
As before, banks and corporate transaction accountholders attempted to 
minimize any cross-subsidization by employing transaction account 
alternatives to evade the interest rate regulation.  For example, some 
corporations simply elected to keep funds that would otherwise have been 
deposited in bank transaction accounts in non-bank mutual funds.
151
  Banks 
offered corporate accountholders “earnings credits” that could be used to 
offset bank fees.
152
  In addition, banks offered services to business 
customers that allowed them to temporarily sweep funds between 
transaction accounts and other accounts not covered by interest rate 
restrictions.
153
  Notwithstanding these alternatives, it is possible that the 
corporate account interest rate regulation, like the broader interest rate 
regulation before the 1980s, resulted in banks’ overpricing some corporate 
transaction accounts.
154
 
 
“various efforts [had] been made to provide low cost alternatives [to bank accounts] for 
certain consumers, these services [were] not available to all”). 
 149. See KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 403 (“Deregulation removed [the] 
subsidy [for low-balance accounts] and induced banks to modify their pricing policies.”). 
 150. 12 U.S.C. § 371a (2009) (repealed by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 11-203, § 627(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1640). 
 151. See Sarah Johnson, Any Interest in Interest?, CFO MAG., July 21, 2011, at 2 
(reporting survey results finding that companies keep 19% of their short-term investments in 
money-market mutual funds). 
 152. See Chris Moon, New Rules on Corporate Checking Accounts a ‘Non-Event’—For 
Now, WICHITA BUS. J., Aug. 5, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 15561315. 
 153. See Financial Institutions Advisory & Financial Regulatory Client Publication, 
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Dodd-Frank: Regulation Q Goes the Way of the Model T 2 (July 
15, 2011), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/308b6f96-4aef-45f4-
8177-a14e9defef2b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bee9d518-a03d-4643-8f57-
25e566030422/FIA-071511-regulation_q_model_t.pdf (explaining that banks would sweep 
funds from corporate transaction accounts to interest-bearing offshore accounts and enter 
repurchase agreements with corporate transaction accountholders allowing them to hold 
U.S. government securities overnight). 
 154. One commentator has noted that “[t]he earnings credit interest rate is typically less 
than that offered by a ‘hard’ investment-earning vehicle and any unused earning credits 
typically do not carry forward from month to month. ”  Dan Gill, Repeal of Regulation Q to 
Impact Banking Relationships, 31 ENTERPRISE 1, 6 (Dec. 31, 2001).  If true, this suggests 
that business accountholders may not have been effective in avoiding overpayment.  Other 
commentary suggests that the implicit interest on commercial accounts was more effective.  
See Prohibition Against Payment of Interest on Demand Deposits, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,015, 
HILL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  10:30 PM 
2012] TRANSACTION ACCOUNT FEES 95 
 
It is difficult to determine who benefitted from any overpricing of 
corporate transaction accounts.  Some suggest that banks kept the fruits of 
overpricing as profits.
155
  This explanation is bolstered by the lobbying 
efforts many banks employed in an attempt to preserve the regulation.
156
  
Others suggest that the removal of the restriction will simply lead to more 
consumer account fees.
157
  This prediction could be rooted in a belief that 
the interest-free commercial transaction accounts were cross-subsidizing 
consumer accounts. 
At any rate, the Dodd-Frank Act repealed the restriction on paying 
interest on corporate demand deposit accounts.
158
  Banks are now free to 
offer competitive interest rates on all transaction accounts.
159
  Thus, direct 
interest rate regulation should no longer be a source of cross-subsidization 
in transaction account pricing. 
 
42,016 (July 18, 2011) (noting that one bank supporting the repeal of the interest restriction 
argued that it “‘has been pretty much hollowed out and therefore rendered irrelevant through 
the years.’”) (quoting an anonymous bank); Johnson, supra note 151, at 2 (“What [business 
accountholders are] making now from checking accounts through earnings credits (soft 
dollars used to offset banking fees) is currently higher than money market fund rates . . . .”). 
 155. See John Hamby, Viewpoint, Repeal of Reg Q a Great Opportunity, AM. BANKER, 
Oct. 7, 2010, at 8 (“Many [banks] saw business checking accounts as merely ‘cost-free’ 
funds.  Although most have some type of program for earnings credits to offset fees, they 
tend to favor minimal rates and a limited array of services, hoping that excess funds will be 
left in the bank without compensation.”); Tamarind Phinisee, Dodd-Frank Creating 
Regulatory Burden for Community Banks, SAN ANTONIO BUS. J., July 29, 2011, available at 
2011 WLNR 15048338 (“Under Reg Q, banks, in essence, kept the interest earned on the 
money in these accounts as part of their profit margins.”). 
 156. See Kari Taylor, Growing Interest in Interest, BANK NEWS, July 1, 2011, at 50 
(reporting that the Independent Community Bankers of America and the Independent 
Bankers Association of Texas opposed the move to lift the interest rate restriction). 
 157. See Letter from Christopher Cole, Senior Vice President & Reg’l Counsel, Indep. 
Cmty. Bankers of Am. to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys. & Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, FDIC (May 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/cl051311.pdf (stating that when banks can pay 
interest on business transaction accounts “[c]onsumers . . . will see new charges for bank 
services as banks seek to cover their increased funding costs”). 
 158. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
11-203, § 627(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1640; Prohibition Against Payment of Interest on Demand 
Deposits, 78 Fed. Reg. at 42,015–20.  Since the repeal, there have been few pricing 
adjustments.  See, e.g., Moon, supra note 152.  It is difficult to know whether this should be 
attributed to the lack of a subsidy under the interest rate regulation or to the prevailing low 
interest rates at the time of the change.  See Robert Barba, Bankers Split on Impact of Reg. 
Q Move, AM. BANKER, Mar. 18, 2011, at 1 (quoting a banker who believes that “‘[i]n this 
rate environment, [repeal of the interest rate restriction] doesn’t have an immediate effect 
because of how low rates are’”). 
 159. Perhaps the only remaining significant restriction is that undercapitalized banks 
cannot solicit deposits “by offering rates of interest that are significantly higher than the 
prevailing rates of interest on insured deposits.”  12 U.S.C. § 1831f(h) (Supp. 2011). 
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iii. Fee Regulation 
As policymakers relaxed the regulation of interest on transaction 
accounts, they simultaneously increased their scrutiny of bank fees.  Like 
interest rate regulations, fee regulations can potentially lead to cross-
subsidization.  Due in part to contradictory attitudes about banks’ fees, 
regulations provide conflicting incentives for banks regarding account 
pricing.  Some regulations encourage pricing structures with high overdraft 
charges and other penalty-type fees, while other regulations discourage 
overdrafts on debit card transactions.  This conflict, and the fact that fee 
regulations are largely aimed at disclosure, suggests that fee regulations 
themselves have had only a limited impact on transaction account pricing. 
When interest rates were capped, neither the federal nor the state 
governments were particularly interested in regulating banks’ fee 
income.
160
  For this reason Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Article 4, 
which was originally completed in 1952
161
 and generally governs checking 
accounts, does not directly address fees.
162
  As currently drafted, the U.C.C. 
requires that banks act in “good faith” when dealing with account 
holders.
163
  However, “good faith” is narrowly defined and requires only 
“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing.”
164
  This good faith standard gives banks wide discretion to 
charge transaction account fees.
165
 
States have also enacted laws that prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.
166
  For example, in Texas, the Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
 
 160. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 161. The U.C.C. was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws and then enacted by state legislatures throughout the country.  See STEPHEN C. 
VELTRI, THE ABCS OF THE UCC, ARTICLE: 3 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, ARTICLE 4: BANK 
DEPOSITS 4-5 (2d ed. 2004); Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Marc G. Tarlow, Reflections on Articles 3 
and 4 for a Review Committee, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 919, 919 n.1 (1975). 
 162. See Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: 
A Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REV. 679, 713 (1991) (“When the [U.C.C.] was first 
drafted and promulgated, the issue of ancillary fees was less pressing than it is today.  It was 
not until the 1980s that banks began to look to multiple fees on individual accounts as a 
significant revenue source.”); see also U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 3 (2011) (“This Act does not 
regulate fees that banks charge their customers for a notice of postdating or other services 
covered by the Act . . . .”). 
 163. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2011) (“Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial 
Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”). 
 164. Id. § 1-201(b)(20). 
 165. Cf.  Hillebrand, supra note 162, at 695 (“A good faith standard is not an adequate 
substitute for more specific consumer protections, because a good faith standard can be 
enforced only through cumbersome and expensive fact-based litigation.”). 
 166. Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: 
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 446 (1991) (“[S]tate 
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protects consumers from “false, misleading, and deceptive business 
practices.”
167
  Although these Acts generally protect only “consumers” of 
“goods and services,”
168
 courts have held that a depositor is a “consumer” 
of “banking services.”
169
  Most states grant aggrieved customers the right to 
sue for damages from violations of the statute.
170
 
As banks began to charge fees, customers upset with those fees 
brought suits against banks using the ill-suited U.C.C., deceptive trade 
practices acts, and other common law tools.
171
  Because these types of suits 
were largely ineffective,
172
 it is unlikely that these laws have had much 
impact on banks’ pricing of transaction accounts. 
As account fees became more widespread, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) began to worry that state fee regulation 
could hurt the national banks that it supervised.
173
  Some states began 
hinting that further fee regulation could be forthcoming.
174
  To prevent 
 
legislatures, beginning in the late 1950s, began enacting statutes designed to prohibit 
deceptive and, in some states, unfair practices. By 1981, every state in the country had 
enacted such a statute.”) (citations omitted). 
 167. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44(a) (West 2011). 
 168. Id. § 17.45. 
 169. Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16, 28 n.12 (5th Cir. 1992); see generally 
RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, THE LAWYER’S GUIDE TO THE TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 
ACT § 2.033[B] (2010). 
 170. Sovern, supra note 166, at 448. 
 171. See, e.g., Saunders v. Mich. Ave. Nat’l Bank, 662 N.E.2d 602, 607–11 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1996) (holding that a bank’s overdraft fee did not amount to a deceptive practice, did not 
violate the bank’s duty of good faith, and was not unconscionable); Daniels v. PNC Bank, 
N.A., 738 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a bank did not violate its duty of 
good faith by sorting checks in a manner that maximized the overdraft fees charged to 
customers); Wallace v. Nat’l Bank of Comm., 938 S.W.2d 684 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that a 
bank did not violate the duty of good faith by charging insufficient funds and return check 
fees even when those fees were increased after the account agreement was signed). 
 172. In two cases, courts determined that the plaintiff had presented issues of fact that 
could be presented to a jury.  See Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985) 
(reversing the trial court’s dismissal of a claim that a $6 overdraft charge was 
unconscionable); Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 1987) (holding that 
issues of fact existed as to whether the bank had acted in good faith when setting fees).  
Both cases eventually settled.  See James J. White, NSF Fees, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 188 
(2007).  Other plaintiffs were not so successful.  See White, supra, at 192 (stating that 
“Perdue and Best were the high-water mark” for cases challenging bank fees and noting that 
“there are no reported opinions to document any plaintiff victories after 1987”). 
 173. See Interpretive Ruling Concerning National Bank Service Charges, 48 Fed. Reg. 
54,319, 54,319 (Dec. 2, 1983) (citing “litigation . . . over deposit account service charges” 
as a motivating factor behind new preemption rules). 
 174. Vermont, for example, began conducting a quarterly survey of bank fees.  VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 10,501–04 (2011).  In addition, New York and New Jersey adopted laws 
requiring banks to offer basic transaction accounts with low monthly fees, but did not cap 
fees on regular bank accounts.  See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing basic bank accounts in 
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states from regulating fees charged by national banks, the OCC 
promulgated a rule authorizing national banks to charge transaction account 
fees.
175
  The rule further explained that any state regulation of fees was 
preempted by federal law, including the OCC’s own regulation regarding 
fees.
176
  Preemption freed nationally chartered banks, including nearly all of 
the large banks, from state fee regulation laws.
177
  Nationally chartered 
banks need only follow the federal law including the OCC regulations. 
OCC regulations give national banks the authority to charge 
transaction account fees.
178
  The regulations state that “[t]he establishment 
of non-interest charges and fees, their amounts, and the method of 
calculating them are business decisions to be made by each bank, in its 
discretion, according to sound banking judgment and safe and sound 
banking principles.”
179
  A fee is “in accordance with safe and sound 
banking principles if the bank employs a decision-making process through 
which it considers” specifically identified factors including “[t]he cost 
incurred by the bank in providing the service.”
180
  While national banks are 
 
greater detail). 
 175. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000(b) (1984) (“Establishment of deposit account service 
charges, and the amounts thereof, is a business decision made by each bank and the [OCC] 
will not substitute its judgment.”). 
 176. See id. § 7.8000(c) (“A national bank may establish any deposit account service 
charge . . . notwithstanding any state laws which prohibit the charge assessed or limit or 
restrict the amount of that charge.  Those laws impair the efficiency of national banks and 
conflict with the regulatory scheme governing the national banking system and are 
preempted by federal law.”). 
 177. Over the years, the OCC softened the preemption language in its regulations.  
White, supra note 172, at 197.  More recently, the Dodd-Frank Act adopted new preemption 
standards for state law consumer protection measures.  See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b) (Supp. 2011) 
(stating that “consumer financial laws are preempted” if they “prevent[] or significantly 
interfere[] with the exercise by the national bank of its powers”).  The OCC regulation now 
provides that “[t]he OCC applies preemption principles derived from the United States 
Constitution, as interpreted through judicial precedent, when determining whether State 
laws apply that purport to limit or prohibit charges and fees.”  12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(d) (2012).  
Under Dodd-Frank’s new preemption standards, state laws that require national banks to 
provide transaction account services at prices lower than their marginal cost may still be 
preempted.  Courts might reasonably conclude that a state law requiring below-cost service 
conflicts with the federal law’s interest in maintaining a safe and sound banking system.  
See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,549, 43,556 (July 21, 2011) 
(explaining that the OCC fee regulation could still preempt state law following Dodd-
Frank); Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 640 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that a state law regulating bank check cashing fees was preempted by OCC regulation after 
Dodd-Frank). 
 178. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(a). 
 179. Id. § 7.4002(b)(2); see also GAO, BANK FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 25–28 
(noting that as long as fees are properly disclosed, regulators will only interfere with a 
bank’s fee structure if that structure poses a safety and soundness concern). 
 180. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(b)(2)(i). 
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to consider the cost of providing transaction account services in setting the 
fees, the regulation does not prohibit fees that exceed the cost of providing 
the service.
181
  A bank must also consider:  “[t]he deterrence of misuse by 
customers of banking services; [t]he enhancement of the competitive 
position of the bank in accordance with the bank’s business plan and 
marketing strategy; and [t]he maintenance of the safety and soundness of 
the institution.”
182
 
The OCC regulations (and similar state regulations
183
) do not on their 
face require cross-subsidization in transaction account pricing.  They do not 
require banks to charge any group less than the incremental cost of 
providing the service.  Nor do the regulations require that banks charge any 
group of consumers more than the stand-alone cost of providing service to 
that group.  Indeed, by emphasizing the need to consider the cost of 
providing the service, the regulations may discourage cross-subsidization. 
The regulations may, however, impact how banks structure their fees.  
In particular, the regulations suggest that banks should adopt pricing 
structures that deter customers from misusing banking services.
184
  The 
OCC explained that this provision was intended to allow banks to charge 
relatively high fees for overdrafts and returned checks.
185
  Writing bad 
checks was (and still is) a tactic of thieves and con-artists.
186
  Bad checks 
often lead to losses for the banks involved in processing the check as well 
as for others who accepted the check before depositing it.
187
  While the 
OCC was interested in preventing these losses, it may also have been 
motivated by a concern that a large volume of bad checks would undermine 
the credibility of banks or checks in general.
188
  In any event, the OCC saw 
 
 181. See Video Trax, Inc. v. NationsBank, N.A., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1051 (S.D. Fla. 
1998) (holding that it was reasonable for a bank to consider profit margin in setting fees). 
 182. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(b)(2)(ii)-(iv). 
 183. Some states have adopted fee laws substantially similar to the OCC regulation.  See, 
e.g., 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5e(b) (2011); MINN. STAT. § 48.512(7) (2011). 
 184. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(b)(2)(ii). 
 185. See Interpretive Ruling Concerning National Bank Service Charges, 48 Fed. Reg. 
54,319, 54,319 (Dec. 2, 1983) (opining that overdraft fees should be high enough to 
“discourage customers from frequently writing checks in amounts greater than their account 
balances”). 
 186.  See Julie Andersen Hill, Cashier’s Check Scam Targets Attorneys, 14 J. CONSUMER 
& COM. L. 54 (2011) (discussing frauds perpetrated by check); White, supra note 172, at 
185 (“In the early days, giving someone a bad check was so morally reprehensible that it 
sometimes landed one in jail.”). 
 187. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 188. See Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1169 n.4 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting a 
bank’s claim that “overdrafts are detrimental to the banking system because at some level 
they will cause a loss of confidence in checks as a medium of payment.”); White, supra note 
172, at 185 (“A bounced check might even draw a reproach from the banker on whose bank 
the check was drawn for fear that the checks from that bank would get a bad name.”). 
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penalty-type fees as a way to discourage bad behavior. 
It is unclear what role OCC regulations play in banks’ transaction 
account pricing.  Some banks do cite deterrence as a reason for high 
overdraft charges.  For example, the website of ACNB Bank in Gettysburg, 
Pennsylvania explains that its overdraft fee is “like a ticket or a fine you 
pay for speeding.”
189
  In addition, banks in litigation and administrative 
proceedings justify overdraft fees citing their desire to deter overdrafts.
190
  
It is possible that the OCC’s fee regulations encourage some banks to adopt 
higher overdraft and insufficient funds fees than they otherwise would. 
Similarly, laws aimed at improving the transparency of transaction 
account pricing might encourage banks to adopt penalty-type fees instead 
of monthly fees.  Under the Truth in Savings Act and accompanying 
regulations, banks may advertise a transaction account as “free” or “no-
cost” only if it does not have a minimum balance, does not have a limit on 
the number of transactions, and does not charge “any regular service or 
transaction fee.”
191
  In other words, an account can be marketed as “free” 
even if it has large overdraft, insufficient funds, and other penalty fees.
192
  
The apparent rationale behind this regulatory approach was that, unlike 
overdraft fees and other penalty fees, customers could not readily avoid 
regular service fees.
193
 
The Truth in Savings Act likely encourages banks to use fees that will 
 
 189. ACNB Bank, Frequently Asked Questions About Overdraft Services, 
http://www.acnb.com/home/fiFiles/static/documents/Opt_In_Project_FAQs_final_101311.p
df (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).  Although the regulation was aimed at checks, ACNB’s 
literature does not distinguish between check overdrafts and debit overdrafts when it offers 
the deterrence justification.  Id.  ACNB Bank also cites the risk of loss on unpaid overdrafts 
as a justification for the fee.  Id. 
 190. See, e.g., Wallace, 55 F.3d at 1169 n.4; OCC, Interpretive Letter No. 1082 (May 17, 
2007), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/jun07/int 
1082.pdf. 
 191. 12 U.S.C. § 4302(d) (2011); see also 12 C.F.R. § 230.8 (2012) (listing fees that may 
not be applied to “free” accounts); FDIC, Advertisement for “No Fee” Checking Account 
Violates Truth in Savings Act if Fee is Imposed When Minimum Balance is Not 
Maintained, Interpretive Letter 95-31 (Nov. 21, 1995) (stating that a bank could not use an 
advertisement that used the words “no fee” followed by an asterisk explaining the minimum 
balance requirement). 
 192. See STEPHEN G. CECCHETTI, MONEY, BANKING, & FINANCIAL MARKETS 495 (2d ed. 
2008) (claiming that “bankers joke that ‘free checking’ really means ‘fee checking’ because 
of all the fees customers end up paying.”).  Under current regulations, banks must disclose 
all fees, including overdraft fees.  See Truth in Savings (Regulation DD), 12 C.F.R. §§ 
1030.1-.11 (2012). 
 193. Regulators may be rethinking this historic rationale for the advertising rule.  See 
Office of Thrift Supervision, Order to Cease and Desist, Woodforest Bank, Order No. WN-
10-16 (Apr. 23, 2010) (suggesting that a transaction account should not be marketed as 
“free” if it charges high overdraft fees). 
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preserve the “free” status of their accounts—including large overdraft fees.  
For example, PNC Bank advertises a “free” checking account with no 
monthly service charge or minimum balance.  However, the account also 
comes with overdraft charges of  
- $25 per item for the first occurrences in current and previous 
eleven service charge cycles (limit of 4 charges per day) 
- $36 per item for additional occurrences within the same period 
(limit of 4 charges per day) . . . 
- [, and a continuous overdraft charge of] $7 assessed each day your 
account remains overdrawn for a period of five (5) or more 
consecutive calendar days.
194
 
Of course, high overdraft fees alone, even if adopted due to regulatory 
pressure, do not necessarily provide evidence that some consumers overpay 
for transaction accounts.  In a competitive market, customers faced with 
excessively high prices would simply take their business elsewhere.  There 
are, however, at least two possible scenarios in which some customers 
might pay excessive overdraft fees.  First, if accountholders who incur high 
overdraft fees have few alternatives, those accountholders could end up 
paying more than the stand-alone cost of providing transaction services to 
those accounts.
195
  Second, consumers might suffer from cognitive biases 
that lead them to select accounts with suboptimal pricing.
196
  Behavioral 
research shows that not all consumers faced with high overdraft charges 
will behave rationally.
197
  Some consumers may systematically 
underestimate the likelihood that they will incur overdraft fees and discount 
fees that they will pay in the future.
198
  In a competitive environment, banks 
 
 194. Consumer Schedule of Service Charges and Fees, PNC BANK, 
https://content.pncmc.com/live/pnc/personal/serviceCharges/PA_Pittsburgh_ServiceCharges
.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2012). 
 195. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the possibility that market entry restraints might 
prevent meaningful competition in transaction account pricing). 
 196. See Jennifer Martin, Debit Card Overdraft Services: Will the Federal Reserve’s 
New Rules Enhance Transparency and Consumer Choice?, 29 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 
POL’Y REP. 1, 4 (2010) (“Effective private ordering of overdraft fees for debit card 
transactions is limited due to the disclosure issues and adhesive nature of account 
terms . . . .”). 
 197. According to the Federal Reserve, “[b]ehavioral research suggests that consumers 
may choose the ‘free’ . . . account [with overdraft charges], even though the costs for 
overdrawing the account could end up being substantially higher than the monthly 
maintenance fee, because they may optimistically assume they will not overdraw the 
account and as a result, incur overdraft fees.”  Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. 
59,033, 59,044 (Nov. 17, 2009)). 
 198. See Alces & Hopkins, supra note 23, at 890–91 (describing the difficulty some 
consumers face in understanding account terms); Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of 
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without high overdraft charges might attempt to educate customers about 
their more favorable account pricing.
199
  But any gains from this 
educational effort could be easily lost if other banks change their pricing 
structures to match.  This may encourage banks to persistently offer pricing 
that involves high overdraft charges.
200
 
While all consumers are likely impacted by some cognitive biases,
201
 
unsophisticated consumers of limited means may be more prone to overpay 
for transaction account services.  As Professor Gregory Mitchell explains:  
“[R]esearch tells us that cognitive biases do not affect us all with uncanny 
consistency.  In particular, differences in education, training, cognitive 
capacity, thinking dispositions, sex, and cultural background across 
individuals appear to be reliably associated with different levels of 
cognitive performance.”
202
  Perhaps this partially explains why, according 
to an FDIC study, only about 25% of transaction accountholders incur 
overdraft fees in any given year.
203
  As illustrated by the following table, 
consumers who lived in lower-income census tracts were more likely to 
incur overdrafts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1635, 1663 (2006) (stating that overpricing may occur when consumers “overlook or 
underestimate” transaction costs). 
 199. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17–
18 (2008). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 
(1997) (stating that “people in most social categories” exhibit the cognitive bias of over-
optimism) (citing Shelly E. Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the 
Healthy Mind 33 (1990)). 
 202. Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be 
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 87 
(2002). 
 203. FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at 76.  The FDIC study gathered one year 
worth of account-level data for overdrafts incurred by customers at a nonrandom sample of 
thirty-nine banks between January 2005 and September 2008.  Id. at 3–4.  These data were 
matched with census data regarding the average income of the area in which each 
accountholder lived.  Id. at 72.  While this methodology does not actually establish the 
income of the consumers incurring overdrafts, it is the best evidence available on this 
question to date. 
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CUSTOMER ACCOUNTS BY NUMBER OF OVERDRAFT 
TRANSACTIONS PER YEAR AND INCOME GROUP FOR SURVEYED 
BANKS WITH AUTOMATED OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS204 
PERCENTAGE OF ROW TOTAL BY NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS205 
CENSUS TRACT 
INCOME BRACKET 
ALL ZERO 1–4 5–9 10–19 20+ 
Low income 100 61.9 16.7 7.6 6.3 7.5 
Moderate income 100 68.4 13.9 6.2 5.1 6.4 
Middle income 100 74.3 11.8 5.0 4.0 4.9 
Upper income 100 78.2 10.5 4.2 3.3 3.8 
Income not classified 100 74.6 12.2 6.0 3.6 3.6 
No tract 100 74.2 12.6 5.1 3.9 4.3 
All income classes 100 74.3 11.9 5.0 4.0 4.9 
 
Similarly, a telephone survey of consumers conducted by the Center for 
Responsible Lending found that consumers who incurred two or more 
overdrafts in six months were more likely to be low-income, single, and 
non-white.
206
  If low-income customers’ cognitive biases lead them to 
inefficiently select transaction accounts with high overdraft fees or incur an 
inefficiently high number of overdrafts, it is possible that these customers 
will end up paying more than the stand-alone cost of transaction account 
services. 
Not all scholars, however, believe that cognitive biases systematically 
lead low-income consumers to disproportionately overpay for transaction 
accounts.  A Moebs $ervices study of over one million account users at 
both banks and credit unions found that only the accountholder’s credit 
 
 204. Id. at 76. 
 205. “Excludes business accounts, savings accounts, other than checkable accounts, new 
accounts, and customers with more than 10 accounts.”  Id. at 76 tbl. IX-11. 
 206. See LISA JAMES & PETER SMITH, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, OVERDRAFT 
LOANS: SURVEY FINDS GROWING PROBLEMS FOR CONSUMERS 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/overdraft-loans/research-analysis/ip013-
Overdraft_Survey-0406.pdf (“The average repeat [overdraft] user is 35-39 years old and has 
a household income of $30,000 to $35,000, and only 61 percent of repeat users own their 
own homes.  Additionally, repeat overdraft loan users are more likely to be unmarried and 
to be non-white.”).  But see GAO, BANK FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 24 (“[The Center for 
Responsible Lending Study] had limitations, including the inherent difficulty in contacting 
and obtaining cooperation from a representative sample of U.S. households with a telephone 
survey and because it relied on consumers’ recall of and willingness to accurately report 
past events rather than on actual reviews of their transactions.”). 
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score had a “high degree of correlation” with the accountholder’s likeliness 
to overdraft the account.
207
  “Gender, age, occupation, income, and wealth 
were found not to correlate to overdraft behavior.”
208
  In addition, Professor 
Marc Anthony Fusaro studied transaction account overdrafts at a small 
Midwestern bank and similarly found that “no discernable patterns 
emerged from these data indicating that people of all income levels 
overdraft equally often.”
209
 
Professor Todd Zywicki offers two potential explanations as to why it 
is difficult to find a correlation between low-income and high overdrafts.  
First, the majority of consumers who incur overdrafts are not “poor” 
because “[b]y definition, overdraft borrowers have a bank account, which 
distinguishes them from many unbanked consumers and suggests that they 
have higher and more stable income than users of alternative financial 
products such as payday lending and pawnshops.”
210
  Second, “access to 
overdraft protection is commonly linked to direct deposit of payroll checks, 
suggesting that many overdraft customers are also steadily employed” and 
not poor.
211
 
While the jury may still be out as to whether cognitive biases impact 
the poor more than the rich, regulators have recently started to embrace the 
theory of cognitive biases as a justification for new regulation.  As a result, 
regulators’ recent forays into transaction account supervision focus on 
consumer education and discourage overdraft and other penalty-type fees.  
For example, under Federal Reserve rules finalized in 2009, a consumer 
must give affirmative permission for his or her bank to pay debit card 
transactions that would result in an overdraft.
212
  Banks can continue to 
charge overdraft fees for debit card transactions, so long as the customer 
has given permission for debit card overdrafts.
213
  If a customer elects not 
to opt for debit overdraft service, the bank must still offer the customer an 
 
 207. Press Release, Moebs $ervices, Who Uses Overdrafts? (Sept. 29, 2009), available 
at http://www.moebs.com/PressReleases/tabid/58/ctl/Details/mid/380/ItemID/194/Default.a 
spx. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Marc Anthony Fusaro, Hidden Consumer Loans: An Analysis of Implicit Interest 
Rates on Bounced Checks, 29 J. OF FAM. & ECON. ISS. 251, 257 (2008). 
 210. Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft Protection, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141, 1165 (2012). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,033, 59,052–54 (Nov. 17, 2009) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.12, 205.17).  For a more fulsome discussion of the 
requirements for charging debit overdraft fees, see Peter J. Wilder, The Brave New World of 
Regulated Overdraft Fees: How Can Banks Prepare?, 127 BANKING L.J. 158 (2010). 
 213. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17(b) (2012).  A bank may not condition its payment of overdrafts 
for checks on a customer’s decision with respect to debit card overdrafts.  Id. § 
201.17(b)(2). 
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account with the same features as accounts offered to those who opt in to 
debit overdraft service.
214
  Consumers can enforce the opt-in provision and 
collect damages for unauthorized charges.
215
  Sources estimate that as a 
result of the new regulations, bank overdraft revenue fell by $3.6 billion in 
2011,
216
 as early estimates showed that only roughly one-third of customers 
elected to retain their overdraft coverage.
217
 
While banks are still able to assess overdraft charges on debit card 
transactions, this increased disclosure is aimed at discouraging banks from 
charging debit card overdraft fees.  Indeed, the Federal Reserve 
acknowledged that the regulation could lead banks to adjust their 
transaction account pricing structures by adopting more monthly 
maintenance fees.
218
  This move hints that regulators would prefer that 
banks charge monthly maintenance fees rather than large overdraft fees—at 
 
 214. See id. § 205.17(b)(3).  This provision was “not intended to interfere with state 
basic banking laws or other limited-feature bank accounts marketed to consumers who have 
historically had difficulty entering or remaining in the banking system.”  Electronic Fund 
Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,045.  The opt-in rule “does not prohibit institutions from 
offering deposit account products with limited features, provided that the consumer is not 
required to open such an account because the consumer did not opt in.”  Id.  For a discussion 
of basic bank account initiatives see infra notes 237–250 and accompanying text. 
 215. 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a) (Supp. 2011). 
 216. Victoria Finkle, Overdraft Rev Fell $3.6B in 2011, AM. BANKER Jan. 27, 2012, at 
10. 
 217. Kyle Mills & Timothy J. Yeager, New Opt-In Overdraft Rules Cost Arkansas 
Banks $39 Million Annually 1-4 (2012), available at http://waltoncollege.uark.edu/faculty/ 
papers/FINN/Costs_Opt_Overdraft_Regulation.pdf (finding an opt-in rate of 31% at survey-
responding Arkansas banks); CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, BANK COLLECTS 
OVERDRAFT OPT-INS THROUGH MISLEADING MARKETING 2 (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/overdraft-loans/policy-legislation/regulators/CRL-OD 
-Survey-Brief-final-2-4-25-11.pdf (finding that “33 percent of accountholders opted-in to 
overdraft coverage”).  These early estimates may be low.  A later survey found that 77% of 
consumers at surveyed community banks opted for debit card overdraft coverage.  See 
Community Banks Explore New Areas of Business to Raise Revenue, ABA BANK 
MARKETING, Jan. 1, 2012, at 3 (reporting on a survey conducted by HEIT, a company that 
provides bank compliance services). 
 218. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,039.  According to the Federal 
Reserve:   
To the extent institutions adjust their pricing policies to respond to the potential 
loss of income from overdraft fees, some consumers may experience increases 
in certain upfront costs as a result of the final opt-in rule.  Nonetheless, the 
Board believes that giving consumers the choice to avoid the high cost of 
overdraft fees, and the increased transparency in overdraft pricing that would 
result from an opt-in rule, outweigh the potential increases in upfront costs.  In 
addition, some consumers will continue to be able to avoid monthly 
maintenance or other account fees as a result of meeting minimum balance 
requirements or having other product relationships with the bank. 
Id. 
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least for debit card overdrafts.  In adopting the opt-in rule, the Federal 
Reserve concluded that banks should not be allowed to offer customers the 
choice of either a maintenance charge-“free” account with debit card 
overdrafts or a monthly maintenance charge account without debit card 
overdrafts.  The Federal Reserve believed that if customers were given the 
choice, many would mistakenly opt for the “free” account with overdraft 
charges.
219
  This reasoning is directly at odds with the theory codified in the 
Truth in Savings Act, that customers are best served when banks charge 
avoidable penalty-type fees.
220
 
As the Federal Reserve suspected, many banks’ first reaction to the 
opt-in rule was to announce new maintenance fees for low-balance 
accounts.  Initial efforts at large banks were focused on accountholders 
who used debit cards for purchases.
221
  Bad publicity, public outrage, and a 
threatened loss of deposits led the largest banks to back away from their 
plans to enact fees based on debit card use.
222
  Banks, however, were more 
successful in raising standard maintenance fees and increasing the account 
balance necessary to avoid these fees.  According to Bankrate, only 45% of 
banks now offer “free” checking, down from 76% in 2009.
223
  
Commentators also believe that many banks are raising other “under the 
radar” account fees to compensate for lost overdraft revenue.
224
  Ironically, 
data suggest that many banks increased overdraft charges to compensate 
 
 219. Id. at 59,044–45. 
 220. See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text. 
 221. See, e.g., Kathleen Pender, New Banking Rules Making Free Checking More 
Elusive, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 2011, at D1 (discussing Bank of America’s decision to “begin 
charging most customers $5 a month for debit card usage”); Jennifer Saranow Schultz, 
Debit Cards: A Hint of Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, at B5 (raising the possibility that 
U.S. Bankcorp would adopt a debit card fee in the wake of the new interchange rule). 
 222. Jennifer Bjorhus, Consumer Fury Forcing Banks to Kill Debit Fees, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Nov. 2, 2011, at 1A. 
 223. See Dave Carpenter, For Frustrated Consumer, There Are Ways to Avoid or Reduce 
Pesky Bank Fees, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 5, 2011, at 7.  While fee structure changes were partly 
motivated by debit card overdraft rules, they were also motivated by new limits on debit 
card interchange fees.  Cf. supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Candice Choi, At Biggest Banks, Even a $5 Overdraft Can Trigger a Steep Fee, 
Survey Shows, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 5, 2011, at 10 (explaining that some banks either changed 
the order of overdraft processing to increase fees or increased the number of overdraft fees 
one customer could incur in a day); Eric Dash, Banks Quietly Ramp Up Costs to Consumers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2011, at A1 (“‘Banks tried the in-your-face fee with debit cards, and 
consumers said enough,’ said Alex Matjanec, a co-founder of MyBankTracker.com.  ‘What 
most people don’t realize is that they have been adding new charges or taking fees that have 
always existed and increased them, or are making them harder to avoid.’”); see also Candice 
Choi, Profit-Hungry Banks Are Apt to Levy New Fees, But They Can Often Be Avoided, 
BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 16, 2011, at 9 (highlighting fees that “don’t get as much attention” like 
TD Bank’s increase in fees for wire transfers and stop payment orders). 
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for the fewer overdrafts incurred.  According to Moebs $ervices, the 
median overdraft fee increased from $27.50 in June 2011 to $30.00 in 
November 2011.
225
  Moebs $ervices explained: “In almost 30 years of 
collecting [overdraft] data we have never seen an increase as high as $2.50 
at one time, especially in a five month period.”
226
  They attributed the 
increase directly to the debit overdraft opt-in regulation.
227
 
It is difficult to determine what this account re-pricing means in terms 
of cross-subsidization.  As previously discussed, consumers who repeatedly 
overdrew their transaction accounts with small debit card purchases may 
have been overpaying due to difficulty understanding the overdraft terms 
and over-optimism about how successful they would be in avoiding 
overdrafts.
228
  To the extent this was the case, the opt-in rule should at least 
partly eliminate this overpayment by bringing the fee to consumers’ 
attention.  If, however, the debit opt-in rule is not successful in correcting 
any consumer cognitive biases, resulting higher overdraft and other hidden 
fees may simply lead to continued customer overpayment.  Again though, 
overpayment alone does not equate to cross-subsidization. 
Another example of recent regulatory action disfavoring overdraft fees 
and encouraging consumer education is FDIC guidance regarding overdraft 
fees incurred in a single day.  The FDIC guidance provides that banks must 
“[i]nstitute appropriate daily limits on customer costs by, for example, 
limiting the number of transactions that will be subject to a fee or providing 
a dollar limit on the total fees that will be imposed per day.”
229
  The 
guidance further provides that the banks should identify customers who are 
repeated overdraft users and offer them alternatives that might better meet 
the customers’ needs.
230
 
Other regulators may follow the FDIC lead.  The OCC recently 
proposed guidance that would similarly require banks to adopt “prudent 
 
 225. Press Release, Moebs $ervices, Overdraft Fee Revenue Falls as Banks Raise 
Overdraft Prices (Jan. 18, 2012), available at http://www.moebs.com/Portals/0/pdf/Press% 
20Releases/120111%20Moebs%20PR%20OD%20Revenue%20%20Price%20Final%201-
18-12%20(2).pdf. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text. 
 229. FDIC, Overdraft Payment Programs and Consumer Protection, 
Final Overdraft Payment Supervisory Guidance, Fin. Inst. Letter FIL-81-2010, 4 (Nov. 24, 
2010), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/fil10081.pdf. 
 230. Id.  The FDIC, nevertheless, made it clear that no bank was required to offer new 
products as a substitute for transaction account overdrafts.  See FDIC OVERDRAFT PAYMENT 
PROGRAM SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 4 (Apr. 1, 2011), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/overdraft/FAQ.pdf (“Is an institution 
required to provide new alternatives to automated overdraft payment programs? No. Banks 
are not required to develop new products in response to the Guidance.”). 
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programmatic limitations on . . . the number of overdrafts and the total 
amount of fees that may be imposed per day and per month.”
231
  Under the 
proposed guidance, banks are also encouraged to provide customers “clear 
and conspicuous disclosures” of account terms, including fees.
232
  
Furthermore, the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has 
launched an inquiry into transaction account overdraft fees.
233
  Among the 
reforms the Bureau is considering is a “penalty fee box” that would display 
overdraft and similar charges in a prominent location on consumers’ 
account statements.
234
  All of these proposals seem driven by the 
philosophy that customers’ cognitive biases are causing some to overpay 
for transaction account services. 
In sum, existing fee regulations are contradictory.  On the one hand, 
OCC regulations and the Truth in Savings Act encourage high overdraft 
and other penalty-type fees on the theory that banks should encourage 
accountholders to engage in responsible behavior to avoid these fees.  More 
recent regulation discourages overdraft fees and encourages broad account 
disclosures on the theory that consumer cognitive biases may lead some to 
overpay for transaction accounts with large penalty fees.  Given the 
conflicting messages to banks, it is difficult to assess the extent to which 
regulations impact banks’ account pricing.  To the extent that overdraft and 
penalty-type fees provide a breeding ground for consumers’ decisions to be 
hampered by cognitive biases, earlier regulations may have led to some 
consumers overpaying for transaction account services.  The evidence 
conflicts as to whether those most prone to the cognitive biases would have 
been low-income customers.  More recent efforts to encourage robust 
disclosure, facilitate consumer choice, and limit large penalty charges could 
potentially ameliorate harm from consumer cognitive bias.  Finally, even if 
some consumers overpay due in part to cognitive biases or fee regulations, 
fee regulations do not offer any reason why banks would pass these 
supracompetitive profits along to wealthy consumers.
235
 
 
 231. OCC, Proposed Guidance on Deposit-Related Consumer Credit Products, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 33,409, 33,411 (June 8, 2011). 
 232. Id. at 33,410. 
 233. Edward Wyatt, Consumer Inquiry Focuses on Bank Overdraft Fees, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 2012, at B7. 
 234. Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau Launches Inquiry into Overdraft Practices (Feb. 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-
launches-inquiry-into-overdraft-practices/. 
 235. See Stucke, supra note 123, at 335–36. 
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iv. Encouragement to Cross-Subsidize 
In spite of growing concern about bank fees, policymakers have made 
few attempts aimed at requiring or encouraging banks to cross-subsidize 
transaction accounts for low-income consumers.  This Part discusses 
policymakers’ efforts to require or encourage banks to provide low-cost 
transaction accounts, sometimes called “basic” accounts.
236
  Like 
transaction account fee regulations, basic bank account policies have 
sometimes suffered from conflicting theories about the fairest types of 
account fees.  Yet, there is little reason to believe that these regulatory 
efforts have resulted in widespread cross-subsidization in the transaction 
account market. 
In the aftermath of transaction account interest rate deregulation, some 
states adopted laws requiring banks to provide basic bank accounts.
237
  If 
these laws require banks to provide transaction account services for less 
than the incremental cost of the services, cross-subsidization might occur.  
New Jersey seems to have contemplated this possibility.  The New Jersey 
statute specifically provides that “[n]o depository institution shall be 
required to offer a New Jersey Consumer Checking Account at a cost 
which is below its actual cost to provide such an account.”
238
  Thus, under 
 
 236. “Lifeline banking was the term originally used by those advocating the provision of 
financial services at reduced prices.”  Canner & Maland, supra note 146, at 256.  However, 
critics suggested that it was not fair to use a term that carried such “life-or-death 
connotations.”  Id.  “Over time, then [the term] lifeline has largely given way to [the term] 
basic.”  Id. 
 237. New Jersey and New York require that banks make basic checking accounts 
available for all consumers.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16N-1, :16N-3 (West 2000) 
(stating that in order to ensure banks “meet the basic banking needs of the communities in 
which they are authorized to operate” those banks “that maintain[] regular checking 
accounts in [New Jersey] shall make available to consumers a [basic checking account] at 
all offices of that depository institution where regular checking accounts are offered or 
available.”); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-f (McKinney 2008) (“It is the policy of this state that, 
consistent with safe and sound banking practices, banking institutions make available lower 
cost banking services to consumers.”).  Illinois and Massachusetts require that banks make 
basic checking accounts available to some consumers.  205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/4 (2011) 
(“Every financial institution shall offer a Basic Checking Account to any natural person 65 
years of age or older who requests such an account.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167D, § 2 
(2011) (providing basic checking accounts for consumers 18 or younger and 65 and older).  
In addition, a Vermont statute authorizes its banking regulator to adopt rules requiring a 
lifeline account if the regulator “finds a material deterioration in the availability and cost of 
basic checking and savings account services in the results of any two consecutive surveys.”  
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 10504 (West 2011).  To the extent that these laws would require 
national banks to provide basic accounts without regard to the cost of providing the 
accounts, the state laws may be preempted by federal law governing national banks.  See 
supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 238. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16N-3(a). 
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the New Jersey law, banks could still charge basic account customers at 
least the incremental cost of providing the basic account.  Assuming that 
banks charged at least this incremental cost to low-income customers, 
cross-subsidization would not occur. 
Even outside of New Jersey, basic account laws are unlikely to lead to 
cross-subsidization.  Basic bank account laws typically allow banks to 
charge some fees for the account—including overdraft fees—provided that 
the fees do not exceed those for other accounts.
239
  Perhaps because these 
fees can be substantial, New York has concluded that its law does not result 
in the cross-subsidization of its basic account.
240
 
It is possible that in the future, federal banking regulators will join the 
basic bank account states in requiring low maintenance fee accounts for 
some consumers.  Depending on their construction, mandatory basic 
accounts could force banks to price some transaction accounts below the 
incremental cost of the service and lead to cross-subsidization.  Federal 
regulators have repeatedly experimented with basic banking projects but 
have so far been unwilling to make such accounts mandatory. 
In 2001, the Department of the Treasury (hereinafter “Treasury”) 
began a program known as “First Accounts.”
241
  Under the program, 
Treasury awarded grants to community-based non-profit organizations and 
financial institutions in order to “provide low-cost checking or savings 
accounts to ‘unbanked’ low- and moderate-income individuals.”
242
  This 
created a direct subsidy to low-income consumers.  Under the First 
Accounts program, “85 percent of the accounts opened were savings 
accounts” rather than transaction accounts.
243
  Of the two grant recipients 
who focused primarily on transaction accounts, one experienced problems 
like large overdrafts with nearly half of the new accounts opened.
244
  The 
 
 239. See 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/4(c); N.J ADMIN. CODE § 3:1-19.2(a)(9) (2011); 
Grace Sterrett, Basic Banking: New York’s Attempt to Democratize Banking Services, 49 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 13, 14 (1995) (discussing the basic bank account regulation in 
New York). 
 240. See Letter from Richard H. Neiman Superintendent of Banks, N.Y. State Banking 
Dep’t, to Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (June 4, 2010), available at http://www.banking.state.ny. 
us/prlt100604.htm  (“Based on data from the past 15 years since the basic banking account 
was introduced by the New York Legislature, we find that the account is not a ‘loss-leader’ 
for banking institutions.”). 
 241. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINDINGS FROM THE FIRST ACCOUNTS 
PROGRAM (Jan. 2009). 
 242. Id. at iii. 
 243. Id. at 4-5 (“Thus for the most part, the First Accounts program helped participants 
gain access to accounts that would support savings, but were not designed to encourage the 
use of accounts for transactions.”). 
 244. See id. at 4-7, 12-11.  That program, operated by Mission of Peace in conjunction 
with Fifth Third Bank, offered checking accounts with no monthly fees or minimum 
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First Accounts program did not attempt to determine whether the accounts 
had been profitable for the financial institutions that participated. 
More recently, the FDIC created a “Model Safe Accounts Template” 
to provide banks “with guidelines for offering cost-effective 
transactional . . . accounts that are safe and affordable for consumers.”
245
  
The account template allows customers to maintain a minimum balance of 
$1.
246
  While it does allow a monthly fee of up to $3, it does not allow any 
overdraft or insufficient funds fees.
247
  The account is card-based and does 
not allow customers to write checks.
248
 
To help determine whether the Model Safe Accounts Template is 
feasible, the FDIC conducted a pilot program.
249
 For one year beginning on 
January 1, 2011, the FDIC collected information from nine banks that 
volunteered to participate.
250
  While the nine participating banks were not a 
representative group of financial institutions,
251
 the FDIC concluded that 
“[t]he pilot showed that safe, low-cost accounts are valuable to consumers 
and feasible for banks.”
252
  The FDIC was especially encouraged that only 
about “20 percent of the transaction accounts were closed by the end of the 
pilot.”
253
  By disallowing checks and overdraft transactions, banks were 
able to limit the “instances of fraud or intentional mismanagement.”
254
  
This suggests that currently unbanked consumers become stable customers 
when offered transaction accounts with transparent and attractive terms. 
The FDIC pilot, however, had a more difficult time determining 
whether the accounts were economically feasible for the banks.  The 
participating banks “did not uniformly define and allocate fixed and 
 
balances.  Id. at 12-12.  However, the accounts were subject a $30 charge per overdraft item.  
Id.  Under the Mission of Peace program, a grant of $425,316 translated into 660 checking 
accounts.  Id. at 12-1.  To minimize losses, Fifth Third “monitored [the accounts] very 
closely and closed [them] quickly if serious problems occurred.”  Id. at 12-11. 
 245. FDIC Model Safe Accounts Template (Aug. 4, 2011), 
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/template/template.pdf. 
 246. Id.  Under the template, banks can require a $10 deposit to open an account.  Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. FDIC MODEL SAFE ACCOUNTS PILOT: FINAL REPORT (Apr. 2012), available at http 
://www.fdic.gov/consumers/template/SafeAccountsFinalReport.pdf. 
 250. Id. at 1, 3. 
 251. Id. at 3, 5 (noting that the banks were Bath Savings Institution (Bath, ME), Citibank 
(New York, NY), Cross County Savings Bank (Middle Village, NY), First State Bank 
(Union City, TN), ING Direct (Wilmington, DE), Liberty Bank and Trust Company (New 
Orleans, LA), Pinnacle Bank (Lincoln, NE), South Central Bank (Glasgow, KY), and 
Webster Five Cents Saving Bank (Webster, MA)). 
 252. Id. at 3. 
 253. Id. at 5 (noting that this rate was lower than the industry-reported closure rate of 
30% for regular transaction accounts). 
 254. Id. at 8. 
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variable costs,” and “[i]nformation technology infrastructure limitations . . . 
made it difficult [for banks] to monitor and track costs and revenues.”
255
  
Some banks noted that the marginal costs of the accounts were low because 
the accounts did not have check-related costs and because the accounts 
generated income in the form of interchange fees.
256
  While this 
information seems promising, it is still far from certain that such accounts 
will generate income for banks—especially if banks are limited in their 
ability to assess interchange fees.
257
 
Although neither the First Accounts Program nor the FDIC Model 
Safe Accounts Pilot provided detailed data on basic bank account costs, 
further federal experimentation will occur.  The Dodd-Frank Act 
authorized Treasury to implement a program of grants to “enable low- and 
moderate-income individuals to establish one or more accounts in a 
federally insured depository institution.”
258
  Regulators may eventually 
decide to require that banks provide basic bank accounts.  For now though, 
no federal law requires banks to offer such accounts. 
Regulators do, however, broadly encourage banks to consider 
providing transaction accounts for underserved consumers.  Under the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), banks are required to “serve the 
convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to 
do business.”
259
  The “convenience and needs of the communities” includes 
the need for “deposit services.”
260
 
In spite of this ambitious language, the CRA’s enforcement 
mechanisms are rather weak.  Regulators evaluate a bank’s transaction 
account offerings, along with its credit offerings, and assign the bank a 
rating of outstanding, satisfactory, needs to improve, or substantial non-
compliance.
261
  Regulators must then consider this rating when evaluating 
the bank’s applications for new branches, mergers, and acquisitions.
262
  
“While regulators only rarely deny such applications based on CRA 
concerns, community groups can slow down the approval process 
 
 255. Id. at 7. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text (discussing the Durbin Amendment 
and the impact it may have on transaction account pricing). 
 258. 12 U.S.C. § 5623 (Supp. 2011); see also Financial Access Activities; Comment 
Request, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,499, 56,500 (Sept. 13, 2011) (requesting comments “on how 
[Treasury] can encourage activities that enable low- and moderate-income individuals to 
establish one or more accounts in a federally insured depository institution and to improve 
access to the provision of such accounts”). 
 259. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1) (Supp. 2011). 
 260. Id. § 2901(a)(2). 
 261. Id. § 2906(b)(2). 
 262. Id. §§ 2902(2), 2903. 
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significantly with CRA protests.”
263
  Thus, it is possible that some banks 
looking to expand or merge might offer below-cost transaction accounts to 
low-income consumers to assuage any CRA-related concerns. 
For example, when Washington Mutual acquired Great Western Bank 
in 1997, Washington Mutual, among other things, promised two 
community-based organizations that it would introduce a checking account 
without a monthly fee or minimum balance requirement in a low-income 
area.
264
  In exchange, the community-based organizations promised not to 
oppose the acquisition.
265
  It is difficult to determine how often community-
based organizations successfully influence banks’ transaction account 
fees.
266
  However, to the extent that the CRA is influential, it should 
encourage progressive, rather than regressive, cross-subsidization because 
community-based groups should be most concerned about low-income 
individuals.
267
 
It appears, then, that although current regulations do not require banks 
to provide any service at a loss, the CRA might encourage some banks to 
voluntarily do so.  Low-income consumers are those most likely to be 
helped or subsidized by the CRA. 
C. Agency Problems 
Agency problems, like regulations, could lead to cross-subsidization 
in transaction account pricing.  Banks, like other corporations, are run by 
bank managers whose interests might not always align with the profit-
maximizing interests of shareholders.  Some community-minded financial 
institutions may choose pricing structures that cross-subsidize transaction 
accounts for low-income consumers.  Other banks, motivated by 
discriminatory intent or a desire to grow, may choose pricing structures that 
cross-subsidize a preferred group of consumers. 
 
 263. Stegman et al., supra note 29, at 409 n.15. 
 264. KENNETH H. THOMAS, THE CRA HANDBOOK 118-20 (1998). 
 265. Id. 
 266. See NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, CRA COMMITMENTS 53-54 
(Sept. 2007), available at http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/ 
cdfis/report-silver-brown.pdf (identifying several CRA agreements that include provisions 
for basic transaction accounts); Canner & Maland, supra note 146, at 258 n.8 (“In 16 out of 
22 [CRA] agreements recently reviewed by Federal Reserve staff, basic banking was a 
negotiated issue.”). 
 267. However, in at least some cases, the community-based organizations have sought 
transaction accounts that could be classified as “free” under current bank advertising 
regulations.  See Thomas, supra note 264, at 120 (noting that WAMU promised to provide 
“its widely-heralded Free Checking Account”).  To the extent that these agreements simply 
encourage banks to adopt pricing structures with high penalty fees, the CRA may have an 
effect similar to that of the Truth in Savings Act’s advertising requirements. 
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Some banks, especially community banks and credit unions, may lack 
shareholder pressure to maximize profits.
268
  Credit unions, at least 
according to law, are non-profit cooperative associations owned by 
“members” who deposit money, rather than shareholders.
269
  While some 
credit unions have now grown so large it is reasonable to believe they 
behave like profit-maximizing large banks,
270
 smaller credit unions may be 
more motivated by the will of their depositors.  Similarly, closely held 
banks may have shareholder constituencies made up largely of bank 
depositors who live in the community serviced by the bank.
271
 
Without shareholder pressure, some community banks and credit 
unions may be willing to offer low-balance transaction accounts below cost 
due to charitable or community-oriented non-profit goals.
272
  If there is 
little competition in the transaction account market (or if large depositors 
are also charitable), banks with such goals may finance these accounts by 
paying less than market interest on high-balance transaction accounts. 
As discussed earlier, small banks have different pricing structures than 
large banks.
273
  In general, large banks charge higher fees.
274
  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine why this difference in fee 
structures exists.  Perhaps it is because community banks and credit unions 
are less profit-driven.  Perhaps larger financial institutions are better able to 
determine the costs of transaction account services and are therefore more 
 
 268. See Marc Schneiberg, Toward an Organizationally Diverse American Capitalism? 
Cooperative, Mutual, and Local, State-Owned Enterprise, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1409, 
1433 (2011) (“Community banks and credit unions are less subject to pressures to maximize 
shareholder value than commercial banks.”). 
 269. See 12 U.S.C. § 1752(1) (Supp. 2011) (explaining that credit unions are organized 
as cooperatives); 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(14)(A) (2011) (providing that credit unions, as non-
profit, mutual organizations, are exempt from federal income taxation). 
 270. See Wendy Cassity, Note, The Case for a Credit Union Community Reinvestment 
Act, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 361 (2000) (stating that a relaxed “common bond 
membership policy has given credit unions bank-like incentives and powers”). 
 271. See Schneiberg, supra note 268, at 1425–26. 
 272. See James F. Bauerle, Regional Banking Outlook: Capital, 128 BANKING L.J. 180, 
180 (2011) (stating that “[m]ost [community banks] have shareholder constituencies that 
own shares out of loyalty to the communities where the banks are located rather than out of 
desire for maximum return on equity”); Choe, supra note 29, at 367–68 (suggesting that 
non-profit credit unions would be more likely to serve low-income consumers); Tony S. 
Guo, Tenants at Foreclosure: Mitigating Harm to Innocent Victims of the Foreclosure 
Crisis, 4 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 215, 252 n.201 (2011) (stating that “[c]ommunity banks 
are ‘mission driven’ instead of ‘profit driven’”); Schneiberg, supra note 268, at 1433 (noting 
that community banks and credit unions are “much more oriented to serving members and 
clients than making a business of subjecting them to an endless stream of fees and 
charges”). 
 273. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 274. Id. 
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efficient in their pricing decisions.
275
  Perhaps larger banks are more able to 
exercise market power.
276
  Perhaps larger banks have higher costs due to 
their more extensive networks of ATMs and branches.
277
  Or perhaps small 
banks have a greater need for deposits as a funding source and thus offer 
more competitive prices.
278
 
While some banks may be partly benevolent, other banks may be 
partly malevolent.  Some banks may engage in discriminatory behavior 
manifested by pricing structures designed to discourage some consumers 
from opening transaction accounts—even when those accounts might be 
profitable for the bank.  If this occurs, some consumers might pay higher 
prices while other consumers pay lower prices. 
The question of whether banks engage in economically inefficient 
discrimination in lending has been widely studied.  The results are mixed.  
Some believe that banks often make discriminatory lending decisions,
279
 
while others discount such claims.
280
  Even assuming significant credit 
discrimination exists, that does not necessarily suggest that transaction 
account discrimination also exists.  Banks may have a greater opportunity 
to discriminate in credit decisions because of the detailed customer 
information they typically collect to evaluate borrowers’ credit risk.
281
  In 
addition, anti-discrimination laws may provide strong disincentives for 
banks to discriminate against protected classes in the provision of 
transaction accounts.  For these reasons, widespread discriminatory intent 
in the provision of transaction accounts is probably unlikely. 
Some managers might have incentives that lead them to maximize 
bank size rather than bank profits.  Managers of larger firms tend to have 
 
 275. See supra Part III.A (discussing information deficiencies). 
 276. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text. 
 277. See Victoria Finkle, Free Checking Isn’t Cheap for Banks, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12, 
2011, at 2 (reporting that “[o]verhead, or the institutional costs not associated with a specific 
division or service” is higher at the largest banks).  But see Legislative Highlights, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2011, at 8 (stating that small banks have higher per-transaction 
operating costs). 
 278. Cf. KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 391–92 (noting small banks’ limited 
access to international capital markets and reliance on deposits as a source of funding). 
 279. See, e.g., William C. Apgar & Allegra Calder, Joint Center for Housing Studies at 
Harvard University, The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of Discrimination in 
Mortgage Lending, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN 
METROPOLITAN AMERICA (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed. 2005), available at 
http://jchs.unix.fas.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/w05-11.pdf. 
 280. See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Equality of Opportunity and Investment in 
Creditworthiness, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1533 (1995) (concluding that creditworthiness, rather 
than redlining, is responsible for minorities’ lack of credit). 
 281. James T. Lindley et al., Racial Discrimination in the Provision of Financial Service, 
74 AM. ECON. REV. 735, 736 (1984). 
HILL_FINAL; (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  10:30 PM 
116 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
higher salaries.
282
  They may also have “increased prestige[] and other 
perquisites.”
283
  A bank manager seeking to maximize the size of the bank’s 
deposit base may choose a cross-subsidizing transaction account pricing 
structure if the bank has market power sufficient to retain the accounts that 
are over-paying. 
A disconnect between the FDIC’s interest as deposit insurer and 
banks’ interest in maximizing shareholder value may provide an even 
stronger incentive for banks to grow large.  When one of the largest banks 
gets into financial trouble, the government often provides bailout funds.  In 
contrast, when a small bank encounters financial difficulty, regulators close 
the bank.  Although the Dodd-Frank Act aimed to reduce the risk posed by 
large financial institutions,
284
 most commentators believe the too-big-to-fail 
problem still exists.
285
  In such an environment, banks—particularly those 
within striking distance of “systemically important” status—may have an 
incentive to cross-subsidize some transaction accounts.  To these banks, 
increasing the deposit base may be more beneficial than the costs incurred 
in providing transaction accounts. 
It is unclear whether the unprofitable accounts added by this type of 
 
 282. See, e.g., Aigbe Akhigbe et al., CEO Compensation and Performance of 
Commercial Banks, 23 MANAGERIAL FIN. 40, 40 (1997) (finding that bank size is “positively 
related to the total compensation (including salary, bonus, and stock options) levels of bank 
CEOs”); Henry L. Tosi et al., How Much Does Performance Matter? A Meta-Analysis of 
CEO Pay Studies, 26 J. MGMT. 301, 329 (concluding that “organizational size [is] an 
important determinant of total CEO pay”). 
 283. Wilmarth, supra note 90, at 288. 
 284. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
11-203, 124 Stat. at 1376 (stating that the purpose of the Act was “[t]o promote the financial 
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to 
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes”). 
 285. See, e.g., Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Dodd-Frank Act: TARP Bailout Backlash and 
Too Big to Fail, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 69, 81 (2011) (noting that “Dodd-Frank provides a 
framework for ending too big to fail if the regulators have the will”); Adam J. Levitin, In 
Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2011) (concluding that large bank bailouts are 
“an inevitable feature of modern economies, in which the interconnectedness of firms means 
that the entire economy bears the risk of an individual firm’s failure”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, 
Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail 
Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 954 (2011) (concluding that “Dodd-Frank’s provisions fall far 
short of the changes that would be needed to prevent future taxpayer-financed bailouts and 
to remove other public subsidies for [too-big-to-fail] institutions”).  Even Senator Dodd, for 
whom the Act is named, seems skeptical of the Act’s chances of success.  He now claims 
the Act was “not meant to prevent another bank from being too big to fail.”  Rather it was 
meant to “prevent [failures] from metastasizing so that they we [sic] can avoid another 
Lehman style bankruptcy.”  Laura Goldman, Dodd Backs Away from Namesake Bill, NAKED 
PHILADELPHIAN, (July 8, 2011, 12:07 PM), http://nakedphiladelphian.blogspot.com/2011/07/ 
dodd-backs-away-from-namesake-bill.html. 
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expansion would belong to low-income or upper-income consumers.  On 
one hand, in theory a bank could grow its deposit base most quickly by 
adding high-balance accounts.  On the other hand, the cross-subsidization 
experienced when banks could not pay interest on deposit accounts
286
 
suggests that banks might not be that efficient in attracting one particular 
type of account, while excluding other types of accounts. 
D. Theoretical Explanations of Cross-Subsidization 
It appears, then, that several theories suggest that some groups of 
accountholders might pay more than the stand-alone cost of providing 
services to that group.  Banks may not be able to accurately assess the cost 
and attach an appropriate price to some transaction accounts.  Laws 
limiting new bank charters and expansion of existing banks might lead 
some banks to exercise market power.  In addition, OCC regulations and 
the Truth in Savings Act might encourage banks to set high overdraft and 
penalty fees.  To the extent that consumers have few alternatives to these 
high fee accounts or are unable to accurately assess the costs they will 
incur, these accountholders may pay more than the stand-alone cost for 
transaction account services. 
At the same time, several theories could explain why some 
accountholders might pay less than the incremental cost to the bank of 
providing the account.  Again, information deficiencies might cause some 
banks to adopt pricing structures where some accountholders underpay for 
the services they receive.  The CRA might motivate banks to agree to 
provide some low-income consumers account services at a loss in order to 
facilitate regulatory approval of bank expansion or mergers.  To the extent 
that other accountholders pay more than their stand-alone costs, the CRA 
could result in progressive cross-subsidization.  Finally, agency problems 
might lead some banks to cross-subsidize some accounts.  In particular, 
management’s desire for growth might lead banks to adopt pricing 
structures that cross-subsidize some accounts.  It is unclear whether this 
subsidy would flow to low-income or high-income consumers. 
At best, a theoretical examination of transaction accounts yields mixed 
results.  While explanations for regressive cross-subsidization exist, 
explanations for progressive cross-subsidization also exist. 
IV. OVERDRAFT FEES AND CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION 
In an effort to better understand whether regressive cross-
 
 286. See supra Part III.B.3. 
HILL_FINAL; (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  10:30 PM 
118 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
subsidization occurs, this Part explores existing empirical evidence 
concerning the prices and costs of transaction accounts.  Its structure tracks 
Gerald Faulhaber’s definition of subsidy-free prices.
287
  First, is the revenue 
from each group of accounts less than the stand-alone costs of providing 
service to that group?  If the poor are paying more than the stand-alone cost 
of service, they would be better off seeking an alternative arrangement.  
Second, do all transaction accounts cover at least the incremental cost of 
providing those accounts?  If the rich are paying less than the incremental 
cost of service, cross-subsidization could be present.  As acknowledged in 
Part I.B, establishing or refuting cross-subsidization can be data intensive 
and difficult.  This Part concludes that existing data are not sufficient to 
clearly establish the existence of regressive cross-subsidization in 
transaction accounts.  In particular, high-balance accounts likely generate at 
least enough revenue to cover the incremental cost of service. 
A. Are the Poor Over Paying? 
Under Faulhaber’s approach, subsidy-free prices exist only when no 
group of consumers pays more than the stand-alone cost of service.  
Regressive cross-subsidization could exist if high overdraft accounts would 
be better off (would pay lower prices) by seeking an alternative 
arrangement. 
It is undeniable that some consumers rack up huge overdraft fees on 
their transaction accounts.  A single overdraft fee can range between $10 
and $38, depending on the bank.
288
  Some consumers can incur multiple 
overdraft charges in a single day.
289
  Given the large nature of these charges 
it is difficult not to agree with a conclusion reached by the Pew Health 
Group:  “Overdraft fees far exceed the incremental cost to the bank of 
providing this service since these transactions, designed to be paid back 
with the customer’s next deposit, pose minimal credit risk.”
290
 
But would low-income consumers who pay high overdraft fees be 
 
 287. See supra Part I.B. 
 288. See FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at 16, 18, 24 (finding a range of 
overdraft fees from $10 to $38, with a median of $27, for overdrafts at banks with 
automated overdraft protection); PEW HEALTH GROUP, HIDDEN RISKS: THE CASE FOR SAFE 
AND TRANSPARENT CHECKING ACCOUNTS 12 (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Safe_ 
Banking_Opportunities_Project/Pew_Report_HiddenRisks.pdf [hereinafter PEW, CHECKING 
ACCOUNT STUDY] (finding a range of $10 to $36, with a median of $35 at the ten largest 
banks in the U.S.). 
 289. See PEW, CHECKING ACCOUNT STUDY, supra note 288, at 12 (reporting that the ten 
largest banks all allow multiple overdraft charges per day). 
 290.  Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
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better off seeking an alternative arrangement?  What would it cost to set up 
a stand-alone system that only provided transaction accounts to low-income 
consumers who repeatedly overdraw their accounts?  It is difficult to 
determine the answers to these questions because no such system exists.  
Nevertheless, comparing similar products sheds some light on this 
question. 
First, it might be reasonable to assume that the cost of a hypothetical 
arrangement for low-income consumers would cost roughly the same as a 
system for all consumers.  To provide transaction account services to low-
income consumers, a service provider would still need a physical location, 
staff, and technology.  As discussed below, the cost of providing the 
average checking account when considering fixed costs ranges from $250 
to $300 per year.
291
  Using these figures, a low-balance account without a 
monthly fee with a $25 overdraft charge, would need between ten and 
twelve overdrafts a year.  An account with twenty overdrafts per year could 
potentially be profitable with a charge of only $12.50 per overdraft, 
assuming no higher risk of charge-off.
292
  But even this amount is higher 
than the overdraft charge at some banks, suggesting that perhaps not many 
low-income consumers would benefit from an alternative arrangement. 
Another potential reference point for the hypothetical cost of 
providing low-income transaction accounts is the prepaid card industry.  
Prepaid cards, also called stored-value cards, are “device[s] that provide[] 
access to a specified amount of funds for making payments to others.”
293
  
While there are many different types of prepaid cards, general purpose 
reloadable prepaid cards are the products that most closely approximate 
transaction accounts.
294
  Consumers using these prepaid cards can receive 
automatic deposits, use the card to pay bills and make purchases, and 
withdraw money from ATM machines.  Unlike most transaction accounts, 
many prepaid cards do not allow the consumer to overdraw the card; the 
 
 291. See infra notes 338–339. 
 292. In considering the hypothetical stand-alone cost, annual average cost of mid-sized 
or small banks are probably a better proxy than the average annual cost of the largest banks.  
However, when using the average annual cost of $350 to $450 for the largest banks (see 
Kapner, infra note 339, at C1) and the $35 average overdraft fee at the largest banks (see 
PEW, CHECKING ACCOUNT STUDY, supra note 288, at 12), an account could recover its stand-
alone cost at ten overdrafts per year. 
 293. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1301, 1556 (9th ed. 2009). 
 294. See Anisha Sekar, The AmEx Prepaid Debit Card’s Dirty Little Secret, 
NERDWALLET (June 22, 2011), http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/2011/amex-prepaid-debit-
dirty-little-secret/ (“The primary reason to get a prepaid debit card is to avoid having a 
checking account to begin with, whether because you can’t make the minimum balance 
requirements to avoid paying fees, or because you simply don’t want to keep your cash with 
a bank.”). 
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consumer can only spend money that has already been loaded on the 
card.
295
  For this reason, prepaid cards do not typically charge an overdraft 
fee.  They do, however, charge other fees.  These fees vary widely by card 
provider, but often include a fee to load money on the card. 
Some research suggests that current prepaid cards are a cost-efficient 
alternative to transaction accounts for those consumers who would 
typically maintain a low transaction account balance.
296
  If this is correct, it 
could suggest that at least some transaction account consumers would be 
better served by making alternative arrangements.  However, the prepaid 
product is not perfectly akin to the transaction account.  Prepaid card 
networks might be less costly for service providers to offer because they do 
not extend credit in the form of paid overdrafts and do not offer check-
writing services.
297
  In addition, some research concludes that current 
prepaid cards are actually more expensive than transaction accounts.
298
  At 
any rate, the current evidence from the prepaid card market is insufficient 
to conclude that transaction accountholders with overdraft charges are 
paying more than the stand-alone cost of the service they receive. 
Credit products might also be partial substitutes for transaction 
accountholders with repeated overdrafts.  Credit cards are the credit 
products that are functionally closest to transaction account overdrafts.
299
  
 
 295. See Gail Hillebrand, Before the Grand Rethinking: Five Things to Do Today With 
Payments Law and Ten Principles to Guide New Payments Products and New Payments 
Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 769, 784 n.36 (2008) (noting that some cards, for example the 
Wal-Mart money card, are not set up to allow overdrafts).  But see Will Hernandez, Prepaid 
Benefit Cards Draw Fire, AM. BANKER, May 17, 2011, at 6 (noting that U.S. Bank “charges 
$10 to $20 in overdraft fees on prepaid cards it issues in Arkansas, Idaho, Nebraska, Ohio, 
and Oregon”). 
 296. See G. MICHAEL FLORES, BRETTON WOODS, INC., ANALYSIS OF RELOADABLE 
PREPAID CARDS IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF RISING CONSUMER BANKING FEES 12-13 (Mar. 
2011), available at http://bretton-woods.com/media/51f57d9869e66aa1ffff8159ffffd502 
.pdf.  (finding that average prepaid card users incurred fees between $76 and $380 annually 
and the transaction account users with the same basic use pattern would spend $218 to $314 
annually). 
 297. The prepaid card also offers some conveniences the typical transaction account does 
not.  For example, prepaid cards can be purchased and loaded in a variety of locations.  
Many of these locations have more convenient hours than bank branches. 
 298. See CONSUMERS UNION, ADDING IT ALL UP: HOW PREPAID CARD FEES COMPARE TO 
CHECKING ACCOUNT FEES (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www.defendyourdollars.org/ 
pdf/Adding-It-All-Up.pdf.  The major difference between the Bretton Woods study and the 
Consumers Union study appears to be the way overdraft charges were included for 
transaction accounts.  The Bretton Woods study assumed five overdraft fees a year, while 
the Consumers Unions study does not explicitly consider overdraft fees.  See Phyllis 
Furman, Prepaid Debit Cards No Bargain, Consumer Group Sez, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 7, 
2011, at 35.  Thus, a debit card may be more expensive than a prepaid card for the consumer 
who does not use overdrafts, but less expensive for the consumer who does use overdrafts. 
 299. See L. Ali Khan, A Theoretical Analysis of Payment Systems, 60 S.C. L. REV. 425, 
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With both debit cards and credit cards, the consumer can make a purchase 
using a card and repay the loan later.
300
  Most observers agree that credit 
cards are generally a cheaper form of credit than overdrafts.
301
  The FDIC 
Study of Bank Overdraft Programs (FDIC Overdraft Study) explained that 
when viewed as credit products, overdrafts can be costly. 
Assuming a $27 overdraft fee (the survey median), a customer 
repaying a $20 [point-of-sale] debit overdraft in two weeks 
would incur an APR of 3,520 percent; a customer repaying a $60 
ATM overdraft in two weeks would incur an APR of 1,173 
percent; and a customer repaying a $66 check overdraft in two 
weeks would incur an APR of 1,067 percent. More rapid 
repayment of the overdraft amount results in higher APRs, and 
slower repayment results in lower APRs.
302
 
In comparison, average credit card rates are around 15%.
303
  While some 
credit card customers pay above average interest rates or incur fees that 
push their cost of borrowing higher,
304
 credit cards are often cheaper than 
overdrafts. 
 
481 (2008) (“When a bank extends a line of credit to an account holder, whether in the form 
of overdraft facility in a checking account or revolving credit in a credit card account, the 
bank obligates itself to comply with the account holder’s authorized payment orders.  Thus, 
no meaningful distinction separates an overdraft account from a credit account.”); Joseph U. 
Schorer, The Credit Card Act of 2009: Credit Card Reform and the Uneasy Case for 
Disclosure, 127 BANKING L.J. 924, 956 n.1 (2010) (noting that credit cards and overdrafts of 
transaction accounts are both revolving lines of credit). 
 300. See Martin, supra note 196, at 1 (noting the similar appearance of debit and credit 
cards).  In the case of a transaction account, the consumer can also write a check or perhaps 
use an electronic transfer. 
 301. In 2004, federal banking regulators issued a brochure to educate consumers about 
overdraft charges.  The brochure suggested that linking a transaction account with a cash 
advance on a credit card could provide a less costly alternative to overdrafts.  BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE ET AL., PROTECTING YOURSELF FROM OVERDRAFT AND 
BOUNCED-CHECK FEES (2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bounce/ 
bounce.pdf.  But see Zywicki, supra note 210, at 1167 n.81 (noting that “[c]redit cards are 
not always a less expensive alternative than payday lending or overdraft protection for those 
whose usage tends to trigger substantial behavior-based fees”). 
 302. See FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at v n.8 (“These examples assume 
that the credit extended as a result of the overdraft occurrence equaled the total transaction, 
that the consumer repaid the credit extended in two weeks, and that no additional fees are 
imposed on the consumer as a result of the [overdraft]. The APRs were calculated as 
follows: ((Fee Charged/Amount financed)*365)/Term (14 days).”). 
 303. Tim Devaney, Credit Card Interest Remains High While Other Rates Stay Low: 
Average at 15.14 Percent Nationally, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, at A10. 
 304. Some credit cards assess annual fees.  Many collect fees for extras like cash 
advances and balance transfers.  Most also assess late charges if a payment is not made on 
time.  See Jason Ashley Wright, Credit: A Fact of Life, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 13, 2012, at 
D1. 
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Credit cards, however, have features that may make them a sub-
optimal substitute for overdrafts.
305
  As Professor Ronald J. Mann explains, 
credit cards can lead some consumers to spend and borrow more than they 
otherwise would.
306
  Racking up credit card debt can contribute to financial 
distress and even bankruptcy.
307
  Thus, some consumers might rationally 
avoid credit cards, on the theory that their cost is far more than the interest 
rate and fees credit cards assess.
308
  It is, therefore, difficult to conclude that 
transaction account fees exceed the stand-alone cost of account service 
based solely on a comparison of credit card prices. 
Beyond this difficulty, credit cards may not be comparable to 
transaction accounts.  Some consumers may use overdrafts because they do 
not have access to credit cards.  Overdraft users tend to have lower credit 
scores than those who do not use overdrafts.  A Moebs $ervices study 
found that “the lower the [credit] score the higher the incidence of 
overdraft behavior and the more overdrafts.”
309
  Similarly a survey 
conducted by the Raddon Financial Group found that of the consumers 
surveyed who were frequent users of overdrafts, 38% self-described their 
credit rating as “fair” and 32% described their credit rating as “poor.”
310
  
Consumers with low credit scores may not be able to secure a credit card, 
especially in financial environments where credit is tight.
311
  Lack of credit 
 
 305. See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 890 
(2007) (“If forcing customers to overdrafts is bad because they are expensive and opaque, 
shifting consumers to credit cards is much worse.”). 
 306. See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF 
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 45–72 (2006). 
 307. See id.; see also Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link 
Between Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361, 1373–75 (explaining 
that credit cards cause financial distress because they allow consumers to accumulate a large 
amount of debt in a relatively painless way). 
 308. For example, Professor Katherine Porter notes that consumers are often reluctant to 
engage in significant credit card borrowing after a bankruptcy.  Katherine Porter, Life After 
Debt: Understanding the Credit Restraint of Bankruptcy Debtors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 1, 37 (2010). 
 309. See Press Release, Moebs $ervices, Who Uses Overdrafts (Sept. 29, 2009), 
available at http://www.moebs.com/PressReleases/tabid/58/ctl/Details/mid/380/ItemID/194/ 
Default.aspx (finding that only credit score was significantly correlated with overdraft use). 
 310. See Raddon Financial Group, Inc., Custom Survey Research Findings 33 (June 
2011) (unpublished survey results on file with author) (reporting a survey conducted by the 
Raddon Financial Group of customers at a single financial institution) [hereinafter Raddon 
Survey].  By comparison, 17% of the consumers who did not use overdraft credit reported 
“fair” credit.  Id.  Only 9% of non-overdraft users reported “poor” credit.  Id. 
 311. When banks experienced difficulty in the fall of 2008, approximately 60% of banks 
responded by tightening their lending standards for new credit cards and lowering credit 
limits on existing accounts.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., OCTOBER 2008 
SENIOR LOAN OFFICER OPINION SURVEY ON BANK LENDING PRACTICES 5, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/200811/fullreport.pdf.  “After years 
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card availability may explain why when asked what they would do if they 
did not have access to overdraft credit, only 10% of one bank’s customers 
reported they would use a credit card.
312
  For consumers without access to 
credit cards, the cost of credit card borrowing is not a reasonable proxy for 
the stand-alone cost of transaction account services. 
Instead, it may be more reasonable to consider the cost of payday 
loans as an approximation of the stand-alone cost of overdraft credit.  If a 
transaction accountholder cannot secure (or has already reached the credit 
limit on) a credit card, then the accountholder might seek to substitute 
overdrafts with other high cost borrowing like payday loans.
313
  While 
payday loans are not generally regarded as a consumer-friendly option,
314
 in 
some cases payday loans can be more cost-effective than overdraft fees.
315
 
Whether or not this is true in any given circumstance probably 
depends at least partly on the size and duration of the loan.  As previously 
discussed, most banks charge a flat overdraft fee of around $30, which is 
not dependant on the size of the overdraft.
316
  This means that low dollar 
overdrafts that are repaid quickly end up with a high annual percentage 
rate, which measures the cost of borrowing over a year.
317
  In contrast, 
payday loans are typically priced according to the amount borrowed.  On 
average, payday loan customers pay between $15 and $20 per $100 
 
of mailing cards out to just about anybody, banks [were] suddenly freezing out all but the 
most credit worthy customers.”  Jane J. Kim, Banks Get Picky In Doling Out Credit Cards, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2009, at D1.  In such conditions, even previous overdrafts may 
disqualify consumers from some credit card offers.  See Drew K. Kifner, Alien to Financial 
Services: Should Social Security Numbers be Required for Banking Services Provided to 
Immigrants?, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 303, 308–09 (2008) (describing a Bank of America 
credit card that required customers hold a checking account with no overdrafts for three 
months). 
 312. Raddon Survey, supra note 310, at 30.  Another 6% of survey respondents reported 
that they would apply for a credit card.  Id. 
 313. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 305, at 889 (“[I]t seems fairly clear that overdraft 
products are more expensive than payday lending products.”); Donald P. Morgan et al., How 
Payday Credit Access Affects Overdrafts and Other Outcomes, 44 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 519, 521 (2012) (“Payday credit is closely akin to the overdraft credit 
(“protection”) supplied by depository institutions.  Both financial intermediaries supply 
credit by postponing depositing a check or debiting an account for a time, providing float in 
the interim.”). 
 314. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE 
FOR THE HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET (2004). 
 315. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 305, at 889; William M. Webster, IV, Payday 
Loan Prohibitions: Protecting Financially Challenged Consumers or Pushing Them over 
the Edge?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2012) (“While . . . overdraft programs 
generally are quite profitable for depositories, they frequently are far more costly to 
consumers than payday advances.”). 
 316. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
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borrowed.
318
  Payday loans are typically outstanding until the borrower’s 
next payday—usually in two to four weeks.
319
  “For loans of about $200, 
the price is about equal, and for loans of $300 or above, a single overdraft 
loan typically will be less expensive.  This calculation will vary, of course, 
depending on whether the consumer is making one overdraft or more.”
320
 
Some empirical evidence suggests that consumers do consider payday 
loans a substitute for transaction account overdrafts.  Brian Melzer and 
Donald Morgan studied how overdraft fees varied based on the availability 
of payday loans.
321
  They found that “overdraft fees are roughly 5% lower 
when payday lenders are absent.”
322
  Banks also varied their overdraft 
credit offerings depending on the availability of payday loans.  In the 
absence of payday lenders, banks were “less likely to offer [overdraft 
protection] programs, and those still offering [overdraft protection] lower 
their credit limits.”
323
  Thus, Professor Melzer and Federal Reserve 
Economist Morgan conclude that there is “competition between payday 
lenders and overdraft credit providers.”
324
 
Melzer and Morgan’s conclusions are curious because we might have 
expected a lack of competition from payday lenders to increase overdraft 
fees, but Melzer and Morgan found the opposite.  They hypothesize that 
“overdraft prices decline when payday loans are prohibited because 
overdraft providers sustain lower credit losses as they reduce credit 
limits.”
325
  Explaining the change in overdraft offerings is trickier.  Melzer 
and Morgan offer two hypotheses, but both rely on the idea that in the 
presence of payday lenders some consumers use payday lenders as a 
substitute for overdraft credit, and banks then react to changing consumer 
 
 318. See Press Release, Moebs $ervices, PayDay Loans Are a Better Deal for Consumers 
Than Overdraft Fees (Jul. 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.moebs.com/PressReleases/tabid/58/ctl/Details/mid/380/ItemID/169/Default.asp
x (“Consumers who use a payday advance loan for $100 or less will pay an average of 
$17.97 . . . .”); Mann & Hawkins, supra note 305, at 861–62 (“In financial terms, [a payday 
loan] is a very short-term, single-payment loan, in which the lender extends a loan on one 
date in return for a promise (usually evidenced by a postdated check or by automated 
clearinghouse (ACH) authorization) to repay the amount of the loan plus a standard fee, 
typically in the range of $15 to $20 per $100 borrowed.”) (citations omitted); Webster, 
supra note 315, at 1051–52 (stating that the “typical” fee for a payday loan is “$15 per $100 
borrowed”). 
 319. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 305, at 862–63. 
 320. Zywicki, supra note 210, at 1170. 
 321. Brian Melzer & Donald P. Morgan, Competition in a Consumer Loan Market: 
Payday Loans and Overdraft Credit (July 5, 2012) (Working Paper), available at http:// 
www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/melzer/Papers/Melzer_Morgan_7_12_2012.pdf. 
 322.  Id. at 2. 
 323. Id. at 2–3. 
 324. Id. at 3. 
 325. Id. 
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behavior.
326
  At a minimum, Melzer and Morgan’s work suggests that when 
presented with a choice between overdraft and payday credit, some 
consumers make an economically rational choice. 
Yet evidence still suggests that some consumers repeatedly incur large 
overdraft fees to gain only a small amount of credit.  For example, the 
FDIC Overdraft Study found that “[t]he median dollar amount [of overdraft 
loans was] $36.”
327
  Consumers who incur low-dollar overdrafts are not 
necessarily irrational.  Payday loans and overdraft credit are not perfect 
substitutes for each other.  Some consumers might rationally prefer the 
overdraft because of functionally different ways these two forms of credit 
operate.  As Professor Zywicki explains, “payday loans are less convenient 
and flexible than traditional overdraft loans, including the time and ‘shoe 
leather’ costs of going to a payday lender, waiting in line, and then 
delivering the cash to a bank or to pay a bill.”
328
  In other circumstances, a 
payday loan might not be a reasonable alternative—for example, when the 
consumer had an emergency
329
 or lives in an area where regulation has 
limited payday lending.
330
  Yet even accounting for the convenience and 
other factors associated with overdraft credit, it seems possible that at least 
some consumers overpay for overdraft credit. 
In sum, there is simply not enough evidence to conclude that the poor 
are systematically overpaying for transaction account services.  It is 
difficult to determine what it might cost to provide stand-alone transaction 
account services for the poor.  Comparing transaction account fees to other 
potentially comparable services like prepaid cards, credit cards, and payday 
loans is far from conclusive.  None of the comparable products closely 
approximate all of the services provided by a transaction account.  Yet in 
each of these cases, there is at least some evidence that the alternative 
product can be less costly than the equivalent transaction account.  This 
leaves open the possibility that some consumers are paying more than the 
stand-alone cost of their transaction accounts.  Further research would be 
 
 326. Id. at 3–4. 
 327. FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at 79.  The study further found: 
[Debit card] transactions were not only the most frequent, but also the smallest, 
with a median value of $20.  The median transaction size of an ATM 
withdrawal and a check that resulted in an [overdraft] transaction were $60 and 
$66, respectively.  [Automated Clearinghouse overdraft] transactions showed 
the largest median at $78. 
Id. 
 328. Zywicki, supra note 210, at 1168. 
 329. See id. (noting that “payday loans might not even be realistically available in some 
situations, such as when traveling or in an emergency”). 
 330. See Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household Survey 
Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 546, 547 (2010). 
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necessary to determine the extent of the overpayment and the 
demographics of those who are overpaying. 
B. Are the Rich Under Paying? 
Under Faulhaber’s second condition, subsidy-free prices exist only if 
each group of consumers pays at least the incremental cost to the bank of 
providing the accounts.  Regressive cross-subsidization could exist if 
revenues from transaction accounts held by upper-income consumers do 
not cover the bank’s incremental costs of providing the transaction 
accounts. 
It is difficult to establish that upper-income consumers pay more than 
the marginal cost of service.  Critics of current account fees point to the 
previously discussed FDIC Overdraft Study,
331
 suggesting that upper-
income accountholders pay few overdraft fees.
332
  The study found that 
“[a]bout 62 percent of accounts in low-income areas had zero [overdraft] 
charges, while 78.2 percent of accounts in upper-income areas had zero 
[overdraft] charges.”
333
  It further found that accounts in upper-income 
areas were much less likely to incur multiple overdraft charges in a year.
334
 
However, this information alone is insufficient to conclude that upper-
income consumers do not cover the marginal cost of service.  As 
previously discussed, other studies have not found a link between low-
income state and overdrafts incurred.
335
  In addition, simply comparing the 
overdrafts incurred by various accounts does not take into account the 
income that a high-balance account would generate for a bank.  The FDIC 
Overdraft Study found that accounts in middle- and upper-income locations 
were more likely to have higher average balances.
336
  For that reason, it is 
difficult to tell whether differences in fees paid by low-income consumers 
when compared with middle- and upper-income consumers are attributable 
to cross-subsidization or to efficient pricing structures. 
 
 331. FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77. 
 332. See, e.g., Protecting Consumers from Abusive Overdraft Fees: The Fairness and 
Accountability in Receiving Overdraft Coverage Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 34-36 (2009) (written statement of Jean 
Ann Fox, Dir., Consumer Fed’n of Am.) (using the FDIC Overdraft Study to advocate new 
overdraft legislation). 
 333. FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at 77. 
 334. Id. 
 335. See supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text. 
 336. “Middle- and upper-income areas had approximately one-third of accounts with less 
than $100 and about one quarter of accounts with an average balance of $3,000 or more.”  
FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at 76.  In contrast, “more than half (56.7 percent) 
of the micro-data accounts in low-income areas held less than $100, on average.”  Id. 
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Reports often claim that many transaction accounts are “unprofitable” 
for banks.  “Unprofitable” accounts could indicate the presence of cross-
subsidization.  The estimated percentage of “unprofitable” accounts varies 
widely, but is often reported to be more than 50% of all accounts.
337
  These 
estimates, however, are largely unhelpful for cross-subsidization analysis 
because they likely include fixed costs.  The estimates that disclose cost 
calculations put the annual cost of providing a transaction account between 
$250 and $300.
338
  These cost data are consistent with average annual cost 
data (including fixed costs) from other sources.
339
 
However, the incremental cost of a new transaction account is likely 
much lower than the $250 to $300 “average” annual cost of providing a 
transaction account.  A 2005 article placed the annual “incremental front 
and back office costs on a checking account . . . between $50 and $60.”
340
  
 
 337. See Mike Branton, StrategyCorps, What to Do with Unprofitable Retail Checking 
Accounts (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.ababj.com/white-papers-2010/what-to-do-
with-unprofitable-retail-checking-accounts.html (“A recent survey by Strategy Corps of 150 
retail banking executives shows that 96% said at least 30% of their retail checking accounts 
were unprofitable.”); Sandra Block, Building a Bridge to the ‘Unbanked:’ FDIC Votes 
Today on Plan to Set up No-Frills, Low-Cost Checking, Savings Accounts, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 10, 2010, at 6A (“A 2009 analysis by Novantas, a consulting firm, estimated that even 
in a ‘good’ year, about half of checking accounts are unprofitable, and that regulatory and 
economic changes could raise that figure to 75%.”); Robin Sidel & Dan Fitzpatrick, The 
End Is Near for Free Checking, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2010, at A1 (“More than half of all 
checking accounts are currently unprofitable, according to a report issued last month by 
Celent, a unit of Marsh & McLennan Cos.”); Hank Israel & Sherief Meleis, Reposition the 
Checking Account, BAI BANKING STRATEGIES (Jan. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.bai.org/bankingstrategies/product-management/deposit-products/repositioning-
the-checking-account (stating that “perhaps 40% of the customer base” of checking 
accounts are “marginal” profit producers); Bob O’Meara, Is it Time to Take a New Look at 
Your Checking Strategy, THE RADDON REPORT (July 16, 2009, 1:52 PM), 
http://www.theraddonreport.com/?p=1573 (stating that for any given bank the segment of 
transaction accountholders who do not generate enough income to cover their operating 
costs can be “more than 60 percent”). 
 338. Branton, supra note 337; Sidel & Fitzpatrick, supra note 337, at A1. 
 339. See Eric Dash & Nelson D. Schwartz, Cut Back, Banks See a Chance to Grow, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 16, 2010, at B1 (“‘The rule of thumb is that it costs a bank between $150 and 
$350 a year’ to maintain a checking account, said Aaron Fine, a partner at Oliver Wyman, a 
financial consultancy.”); Rob Garver, Free Checking Has A Future, Mainly At Small Banks, 
AM. BANKER, Mar. 15, 2011, at 4 (“‘It costs a lot of money to open and maintain a checking 
account,’ said Jim Chessen, the ABA’s chief economist. ‘It costs between $150 and $200 to 
open an account and the annual cost of providing a checking account is between $250 and 
$300.’”).  Of course, different banks will have different transaction account costs.  Moebs 
$ervice, a bank research firm, estimates that an average transaction account costs the largest 
banks between $350 and $450 per year while it costs the smallest banks only $175 to $250 
per year.  Suzanne Kapner, Credit Unions Poach Clients, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2011, at C1. 
 340. Janet Bigham Bernstal, Checking Free-For-All, ABA BANK MKTG., Mar. 1, 2005, at 
14. 
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A more recent white paper prepared by bank consulting firm Haberfeld 
Associates puts the marginal annual cost of a transaction account at about 
$30.
341
  This marginal cost number includes only marginal data processing, 
statement expenses, the cost to issue a debit card and keep it active on the 
card processing networks, and the loss of principle on charged off accounts.  
When considering only marginal costs, the Haberfeld Report concludes that 
less than 10% of transaction accounts do not generate sufficient income 
from fees and interest to be profitable.
342
 
This, of course, leaves open the possibility that some consumer 
transaction accounts do not cover their marginal costs.  However, it is not 
clear that these accounts belong to upper-income consumers.  The 
Haberfeld Report describes one group of marginally unprofitable accounts 
as “single-product customers that are active, but have no overdrafts, do not 
use a debit card, do not buy checks from the bank and have less than $400 
average balance.”
343
  It is difficult to believe that the bulk of such 
customers would be wealthy consumers.
344
 
C. Empirical Evidence of Cross-Subsidization 
Although it is easy to conclude that many low-income consumers pay 
a significant amount in fees associated with their transaction accounts, 
there is not enough information to establish that the poor systematically pay 
more than the stand-alone cost of their transaction accounts.  Furthermore, 
even if banks’ revenue from some subset of low-income consumers 
exceeds the stand-alone cost of providing transaction account service, there 
is still insufficient information to conclude that regressive cross-
subsidization exists under the Faulhaber definition.  Incremental costs for 
transaction accounts are likely very low, meaning that most accounts will 
generate enough revenue to cover the marginal cost of account service.  
Using currently available data, it is impossible to conclude that the bulk of 
accountholders who pay less than the marginal cost of service would be 
wealthy.  Neither theoretical nor empirical evidence conclusively supports 
claims of regressive cross-subsidization amount transaction account 
 
 341. Jeff Platter, Haberfeld Associates, Cost Models and Checking Profitability (Jan. 
2011) (unpublished white paper) (on file with author).  The $30 was the average marginal 
cost of Haberfeld clients “derived directly from customer data extracts [collected] . . . on a 
monthly basis[.]”  Id.  Their sample includes “over 2 million checking households from 
community banks with offices in 46 states.”  Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Indeed, the FDIC study suggests that consumers living in low-income areas would 
be more likely to maintain an account with an average balance below $500. FDIC, 
OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at 75. 
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holders. 
V. BEYOND THE CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION ARGUMENT 
The dearth of evidence of regressive cross-subsidization does not 
necessarily mean that further transaction account fee regulation is not 
appropriate.  Indeed, Part III.B’s discussion of transaction account 
regulation reveals one particularly fertile area for reform:  Fee regulation 
could benefit from a coherent theory.  Fee regulations adopted soon after 
interest rate deregulation encourage banks to charge high penalty fees.  The 
OCC’s regulations encourage high penalty-type fees to discourage 
customers from misusing transaction account services.
345
  The Truth in 
Savings Act encourages high overdraft and other non-maintenance fees by 
allowing banks to advertise accounts without maintenance fees as “free.”
346
  
Even state basic bank account laws allow high overdraft fees, but require 
low maintenance fees.
347
  Some CRA agreements between banks and 
community-based groups similarly allow high penalty fee, low 
maintenance fee accounts.
348
  These laws embody an underlying philosophy 
that avoidable fees are more consumer-friendly than standard maintenance 
fees. 
In contrast, more recent regulation is aimed at discouraging overdraft 
fees.  The Federal Reserve’s recent opt-in regulation allows banks to 
charge debit card overdraft fees only when a consumer has authorized such 
overdrafts.
349
  In addition, the FDIC’s Model Safe Accounts Template 
recommends that banks adopt basic accounts that have a $3 monthly 
maintenance charge, but do not have overdraft or insufficient funds fees.
350
  
These regulatory efforts are premised on the underlying philosophy that 
transparent maintenance fees are more consumer-friendly than avoidable 
penalty fees. 
This Article takes no position about the consumer-friendliness of any 
particular fee structure.  Rather, it offers the more modest claim that 
policymakers would be more successful in influencing banks’ account 
pricing decisions if they adopted a coherent regulatory philosophy.  
Regulations should not simultaneously encourage and discourage banks 
from charging high overdraft fees. 
As policymakers consider competing regulatory philosophies, they 
 
 345. See supra notes 173-188 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra notes 237-240 and accompanying text. 
 348. See supra note 267. 
 349. See supra notes 212-219 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra notes 245-248 and accompanying text. 
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should keep in mind that any adjustments to fee regulations are likely to 
impact low-balance accounts more than high-balance accounts.  Unless 
new regulation explicitly requires regressive cross-subsidization, banks will 
look to fee income from low-balance accounts to cover the cost of services 
to those accounts.  New fee regulation will be less likely to impact high-
balance accounts because investment income earned from high-balance 
accounts offsets as least part of the cost of those accounts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Professor David Heald observed that “the topic of cross subsidy is an 
excellent example of a context where language is used both imprecisely 
and persuasively.  Some consumers are said to be paying ‘too little for 
some goods, at the expense of other consumers who are paying ‘too 
much.’”
351
  This accurately describes assertions of regressive cross-
subsidization among transaction accountholders.  Although it is often 
claimed that fees paid by poor consumers subsidize free accounts for the 
rich, this assertion is not substantiated with currently available theoretical 
or empirical evidence.  Those championing additional transaction account 
fee regulation should look beyond cross-subsidization to substantiate their 
arguments. 
 
 
 351. Heald, supra note 49, at 54. 
